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The Prospects and 
Problems of 
Growth
/ • 
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Based on a paper delivered by Hugh 
Hamilton, S tate Secretary, Building Workers' 
Industrial Union, Queensland, to  the 
Industrial Relations Society o f  Queensland 
Convention held in October 1981.
In dealing with the effects of Queensland’s 
spectacular growth in the 1980s, we should 
view development as part of the big wide 
world. A wider horizon - a world outlook - 
suggests that the 1980s are a period in which 
enormous problems will be confronted by the 
world’s people. Above all, there is a real 
danger of nuclear war, a threat which hangs 
over the head of every nation. Economic 
indicators show that the world is still in the 
throes of an economic slump which 
commenced around 1974. Without revolution 
or wars, countries and the people in them 
seem to be becoming more prone to violence.
These aspects of the world situation, along 
with the exponential growth of technology, 
the micro-electronics revolution, visual 
display units, robots, computers and 
automation are going to make the future of 
many of the world’s people very difficult.
In Australia the 35-hour week campaign is 
one worker-trade union response to the new 
reality. Struggles against mining projects, 
against uranium mining, for conservation, for 
green bans are also signs of concern.
During the 1980s the world of the worker 
will be one of further a lienationand isolation. 
A process that has been underway for several 
years will be speeded up. Critical intelligence 
and conceptual faculties, a past historical 
requirement for the worker, will become even 
more deadened or dimished because of the 
impact of technology. The new technology 
does not require the same critical craft 
intelligence from the workers as technology 
did, say, three or four decades ago.
The technology of the 1980s will no longer 
require the worker to have the skills of the 
past. To a degree these skills appear to be 
passing to a host of managers, engineers, 
supervisory personnel, planners, etc. The new 
materials and specialisation that are so much 
a part of the new technology, limit the 
application of established skills, and they 
have had massive effects on the political 
consciousness of the workers. Through the 
division and sub-division of labor, workers 
have no common employer and no perceived 
common enemy.
Specialisation has led to fewer workers
i <
i pi
? 5);
? o
I i
! i
: i
■: r t  
n
O-'
"T
o iO I:
2 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 78
•Gladstone workers at the meeting where they decided to strike 
over conditions in "boom town".
working for more employers, to sub­
contracting and self-employment. This has 
the effect of alienating the workers from each 
other and creating a sense of isolation. It 
certainly doesn't reinforce a collective trade 
union spirit; it creates "loners". Because of 
fragmentation and alienation at the shop- 
floor level in certain circumstances, what 
could be referred to as the class consciousness 
of the workforce during the 1930s and 1940s 
has been greatly weakened.
Despite a high level of industrial 
disputation, this lack of working-class 
political consciousness has had its effects on 
the trade union movement. In Queensland, 
and throughout the nation, the trade union 
movement has become a very conservative 
body.
Of course, people's consciousness — 
political, social, moral or otherwise — is not
just determined by their part in the process of 
production. There are many other external 
factors that contribute to that consciousness.
Karl Marx's prophecy that the socialisation 
of the productive forces of modern capitalism 
would develop a class consciousness among 
the workers, which would make them the 
grave-diggers of capitalism, hasn't been 
fullfilled in advanced industrial countries. It is 
certainly not happening in Australia. On the 
c o n tra ry ,  m o d e rn  c ap i ta l ism  and  its 
enterprises have become, or are becoming, the 
graveyards of human energy and aspirations.
The system seems to reinforce feelings of 
powerlessness, anxiety, lack of identity and 
social isolation. This is expressed in many 
different ways in the workforce and in the 
struggles in which workers are involved.
Examples such as the Weipa dispute, a 
relativities dispute which lasted twelve weeks;
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the current three months ' dispute of the metal 
trades in the mining industry, a relativities 
dispute; a recent dispute at Wivenhoe where 
the metal unions went on strike over a safety 
issue, and where building and other civil 
workers met and carried a decision 
condemning the metal workers, all show the 
i n a b i l i ty  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  u n io n s  in 
Queensland to reach an agreement on 
p r o c e d u r e  fo r  n e g o t i a t i n g  c o l le c t iv e  
agreements which had been the norm for 
major construction projects in the past ten 
years. Negotiations are held up because of 
arguments about relativities. Demarcation 
disputes are worse still. One has only to reflect 
On the Omega dispute or, more recently, the 
action of the New South Wales Labor 
Council in expelling the Builders Laborers 
Federation.
None of these disputes lays a basis for the 
unity of the trade unions, let alone for 
developing a working-class consciousness 
They don'l create a united force of trade 
union power against the employers.
In the community generally, the effects of 
alienation, isolation and social inequality are 
reflected in the riots at Brixton and elsewhere 
in Britain, the Star Hotel riot in Newcastle, 
the frustrations and traumas that people in 
Queensland have had in the struggle for 
democratic rights, in the "Right to March" 
movement, for example. The proposed 
legislation to give special powers to the police 
for the Commonwealth Games will have the 
sam e  e f fe c t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on B lack  
Australians.
The resources boom
The boom in Queensland and the projected 
spectacular growth of the 1980s is energy- 
oriented. It is a result of the world energy 
crisis which followed the establishment of 
O P E C . A u s t ra l ia ,  rich in m inera ls ,  
particularly coal, attracted foreign developers 
who, as owners of these resources, promote 
them in the world markets. It is also due, in 
part, to a restructuring of the western world's 
economy by major multinationals, assisted by 
g o v e rn m e n ts  in co u n tr ie s  where the 
multinationals have established enterprises. 
Within a decade or less, this restructuring
may have extremely harmful effects on 
Australia.
The resources boom does provide a certain 
number of jobs in the construction, and then 
in the operation, of mines, smelters, berths, 
oil rigs and so on, as well as, sometimes, in the 
construction of towns. But most of the 
resources projects are heavily capital 
intensive. It is not unusual to see a production 
workforce of only one worker for each $1 
million of capital expenditure. This is the case 
with most open cut mines, and it will be the 
case with the smelters now being built. Only 
multinational and large-scale capitalists, 
backed by foreign bankers can make that type 
of investment. It is not John  or Jane Citizen, 
the small Australian investor, buying shares 
in major Australian companies.
The investment in the resources boom takes 
place at the  expense  of A u s t ra l ia 's  
manufacturing industry. The resources boom 
will make Australia a major exporter of 
energy resources and aluminium, with 
multinational companies holding a dominant 
position.
The value of the boom in terms of dollars 
and cents was outlined by Dr. Llew Edwards, 
Deputy Premier of Queensland, at a recent 
seminar:
Only two decades ago, the value of this 
state's mineral production was only some 
$100 million.
In 1968, the value of production broke the 
$200 million barrier.
In 1976, the value of mineral production 
topped the $ 1,000 million mark and last year 
(1980 - H.H.), it reached a record $1,813 
million. Last year's figures would have gone 
close to  the $2,000 million mark had it not 
been for the protracted coal industry strike 
and other disputes.
Over the same period, there has been a 
commensurate increase in state revenue 
from mining royalties and rail profit. In 
1979-80 the state received mining royalties 
of $73 million and rail profits of $86 million. 
The net effect is that the burden of providing 
government services and facilities is greatly 
reduced for the taxpayer. The benefits of the 
resource projects are thus being made
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available to all Queenslanders, and at an 
in c r e a s in g  ra te  as the d e v e lo p m e n t  
continues.
At a time when the states have been asked to 
tighten their belts, the revenue from mining 
activity assumes increased importance.
Manufacturing industry
I do not agree with Dr. Edwards that 
benefits of the resources projects are being 
made available to us all. In order to make our 
trade equitable, this enormous export of 
resources means there is tremendous pressure 
on Australia to import goods. We are im­
porting manufactured goods which we could 
be producing ourselves, but are not. The 
controllers of the global economy of the 
western world, that is, the multinationals, 
have decided which countries will produce 
particular products. They have already closed 
down sections of our manufacturing industry, 
or transferred these sections to cheaper Asian 
areas with which Australian factories cannot 
compete effectively. The multinationals have 
set up "Free Trade Zones" with host countries 
in Asia.
Much of the Australian manufacturing 
industry that has served us well in the past will 
soon no longer exist. Some sections of 
manufacturing, such as factories producing 
rubber goods, footwear, textiles and clothing, 
have already been seriously weakened. Their 
continuing decline acutely aggravates the 
unemployment crisis.
Australia 's self-sufficiency and national 
independence will suffer from all this. The 
plaudits of Bjelke-Petersen, Fraser, Anthony, 
Lang Hancock and others for what they call 
the  "great re sou rces  b o o m "  c a n n o t  
compensate for de-industrialisation of our 
economy. There will be short-term benefits 
confined relatively to a few. But little is being 
said of the consequences which are being, and 
will be, experienced by many people.
Certainly, we should share our resources 
with those who need them in other countries. 
But we should not do this at the expense of 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y ,  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  
community well-being.
One cannot scoff at the potential
investment in the resources boom. The 
current and projected capital investment in 
the resources boom is mind-boggling. The 
potential investment for Western Australia is 
$10 billion. This includes over $4 billion for 
the North-West Shelf. Queensland’s potential 
resources investment is $8,790 million in 
Central Queensland Mines (Queensland coal 
mines are 84 percent foreign-owned), smelters 
and other projects. New South Wales has a 
projected potential of $7,230 million, South 
Australia has an estimated $2,642. Back in the 
field is Victoria, the second most populous 
state, with an investment estimated at about 
$2,770 million.
It wasn't all Hamer's fault that the 
Victorian economy is in bad shape. The rich 
resources are found outside of Victoria, and 
this state is suffering from the restructuring 
and de-industrialisation of manufacturing 
industry. There has been a 13.2 percent 
reduction in the workforce in Victoria's 
manufacturing industry; 13.2 percent equals 
68,500 people. Some of these may come to 
Queensland looking for the big money that is 
allegedly floating around on major resources 
projects. But a significant percentage would 
be older workers who very seldom are 
prepared to travel to start all over again. 
When they lose their jobs, either they remain 
unemployed or else they find other jobs, 
usually lower-paid and very often outside the 
industry in which they are experienced and 
skilled.
Any shortage of skilled labor condemns 
those in control. Skills can be lost forever. In
1974, for example, the workforce in the 
building industry was reduced by some 
70,000 workers, a number of whom were 
highly skilled. Despite the fact that the 
building industry has now picked up and 
needs more skilled workers, many of those 
employed until 1974 have not returned to the 
building industry.
Construction projects
The construction of projects associated 
with the resources development requires 
worker mobility. To obtain this, the employer 
attempts to attract the worker with higher 
wages.
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A typical project construction worker is 
male and under the age of 35 years; generally, 
he does not belong to the town, locality or 
area where the construction is situated. He 
comes from out of town, often from out of the 
state. There is a big complement of Victorians 
and New Zealanders working on major 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r o j e c t s  t h r o u g h o u t  
Queensland.
Usually, the construction worker has a 
young family. Families are often domiciled in 
the town closest to the site, but that can be up 
to 300 kilometres away. Ten per cent of 
families live on the site in company caravan 
parks.
Single workers are accommodated in what 
are called "dongas" — on-site camp 
accommodation. If he is a building worker or 
civil worker involved in constructing the 
camp foundations, site or road preparation, 
he is required to be even more nomadic and 
mobile than other project workers. He spends 
about five or six months on each project. A 
metal worker can expect employment in the 
one place for a period of 12 to 18 months, or 
longer.
The construction of major projects for the 
resources boom sees frequent shifts of 
workers and their families from one site to 
another. This usually means time lost between 
jobs, and no wages. Some of what is supposed 
to be such good money — a building worker 
receives $68.25 over-award payment — is 
eaten up in the lost time between jobs and in 
the cost of travelling to rejoin families at 
weekends. The killer in the resources area is 
not unsafe practice on the job, but death on 
the roads getting from town to the job. And 
boredom or lack of worthwhile entertainment 
on the construction sites can add to the 
pressure to spend more money than might be 
normal on drinking and gambling.
Now let's consider in some detail the 
accommodation available to construction 
workers. For single men, the air-conditioned 
"dongas" are now the norm. There are eight 
rooms in each unit. Each room is 
approximately 2.5 metres by three metres, 
with a bed, a table, a chair, a built-in 
wardrobe and the air-conditioner. Air-
conditioning did not come about by the good 
grace of the employers. They agreed 
reluctantly to this facility after seven or eight 
years of fairly intensive struggle and 
argument.
Even now there are a few employers and 
major clients who want to argue their way out 
of the agreement by suggesting that the heat 
at, say, Hay Point may not be as great as at 
German Creek, and therefore fans will do 
instead of air-conditioning units. Some d o n ’t 
supply accommodation at all.
And now consider the site. Most of the 
mines are built in the desert; there is nothing 
there except open country where cattle 
and bullocks graze, where roads have to be 
built, water has to be piped, electricity and rail 
lines constructed. The sites are often situated 
hundreds of kilometres from any major 
centre.
The camp site
The camp site is laid out so that each 
"donga" opens onto an open verandah which 
is referred to as a "breezeway". This is a 
covered way between two rows of "dongas". 
There can be anything from 16 to  32 "dongas" 
facing one another with a central breezeway. 
At the end of each breezeway there is an 
ablution block with toilets, wash basins and 
showers. Each camp also has a couple of 
laundries, a mess hut, a community building 
and a wet canteen. Most of these units are 
transportable. They are shifted from camp to 
camp.
A married man with his family on a 
construction project is offered a caravan site. 
This consists of a concrete pad for the caravan 
annex and the provision of lighting, ablutions 
and laundries. To help compensate for living 
in caravans and not requiring the companies 
to spend any money on feeding them, these 
workers receive a $30.00 allowance per week.
P e r m a n e n t  camps a re  built on site by the  
construction workers for the production 
workers. These are of higher standard. Single 
men's accommodation is equivalent to three- 
star motel accommodation. Houses are built, 
too. But none of these are made available to 
construction workers. The powers-that-be
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have decided that "dongas" and caravan sites 
are good enough for them.
To date, the employers and clients have got 
away with this situation, but I don't think that 
will be the case for much longer.
It is timely to reflect on the earlier resources 
boom in the late 1960s and early 1970s with 
the construction of the Q.A.L. Alumina plant 
at Gladstone, the berthing facilities built at 
Hay Point and the construction of the 
Greenvale Nickel plant, quarry and rail line. 
At that time, the major clients, employers and 
the state government thought they had little 
or no responsibility for the accommodation 
of the construction workforce and their 
families.
Quality of life
Gladstone reached a situation in the early 
1970s where one in four people lived in a 
caravan park. The local council had t<3 
introduce by-laws to allow temporary 
accommodation in the local showgrounds, 
while the Bole Street caravan park had 1,250 
people living almost on top of one another.
A similar situation developed in Mackay 
during the construction of the Hay Point 
berthing facilities. The showground had to be 
opened up to construction workers because 
the em p lo y ers  accep ted  on ly  to k e n  
responsibility for accommodation.
In the first years of the 1970s, the 
Townsville Council had to make the decision 
to shift hundreds of construction workers 
who were squatting on the Esplanade. This 
was during the early period of the Greenvale 
Nickel project. The construction companies 
couldn’t accommodate these workers nor 
could the town.
We have learned some lessons from those 
days, but serious problems remain.
To examine the social impact and quality- 
of-life issues associated with the resources 
boom, one has to differentiate between 
projects such as mines built in entirely new 
areas, and projects built in established areas.
In the case of the construction of a new 
mine, it is usual that a new town is also built. 
Mines built at German Creek, Gregory,
Saraji, Peak Downs, Norwich Park, Oaky 
Creek, all have new towns that service them
— mostly nice little towns with a good 
environment and a very pleasing community 
atmosphere. But these are often hundreds of 
kilometres from any major centre and, 
therefore, far away from parents, sisters, 
b ro th e r s  a n d  f r ien d s .  Such  iso la t io n  
contributes to physical and mental trauma 
experienced by young workers, especially 
young parents.
The construction of a township lags many 
months behind the construction of a mine. 
The first houses built in the new towns are 
made available to  the management and top 
staff of the construction authority. Other 
houses that come on line remain empty until 
the occupancy is taken up by the production 
management and staff. Houses are never 
made available to construction workers, but 
the company makes them available to  the 
production worker at a subsidised rent. The 
occupant is urged to buy the house, and many 
do so.
In some of the major project areas, a very 
heavy lobby is beginning to  surface among the 
workforce, both in construction and in 
production, for the temporary camp sites and 
the permanent camp sites to be built in the 
environment of the closest town rather than at 
the site of the project itself. The construction 
workforce at the Gladstone smelter should be 
accommodated in the Gladstone environment 
rather than at Boyne Island, 30 kilometres 
from town. This would provide the possibility 
of a variety of activities outside of working 
hours.
Gladstone
But all is not well in Gladstone itself. The 
conditions it is experiencing are a classic 
example of what happens to a town and its 
people when they are associated with rapidly 
developing construction and production of 
major enterprises. The shocking social 
con seq u en ces  p ro m p te d  the  B uild ing  
Workers Industrial Union to initiate the 
research for, and the publication of, a booklet 
on the effects of the resources boom on the 
town. Appropriately named Busting with the
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Boom, this booklet is available from the 
BWIU, Queensland Branch, or from the 
Trades and Labor Council of Queensland.
Up until 1960, Gladstone was a fairly placid 
town with a population around 7,200. In 
1963, the Gladstone Meatworks (Swifts) 
which was part of the United States-based 
National Meat Group was abruptly and 
callously closed down. Lots of people thought 
it was the end of the town but several years 
later Gladstone developed into a major port 
and the world's biggest alumina plant was 
constructed on the site of the former 
meatworks.
In the mid-1960s it wasn't possible to 
foresee the development about to happen 
around Gladstone. This failure to anticipate 
the future was one factor contributing to 
Gladstone's low quality of life during the 
construction of Q.A.L. and such other major 
facilities as the coal loaders and shipping 
berths.
It was possible to imagine A temporary 
boom until the completion of Q.A.L.; then 
construction would move on. But it d idn’t; it 
transferred a mile across the harbor to the site 
o f  th e  G l a d s t o n e  p o w e r  s t a t i o n .
Whatever the excuse for the 1960s, there is 
no excuse today. We now know what is in 
store for Gladstone. While the population in 
1960 was 7,288, in December 1979 it was 
26,250. The estimate for 1985 is 46,200 and a 
population of 62,500 is projected for 1990, 
and these projected levels are based only on 
developments now under construction or in 
the late stages of planning. With this 
knowledge we should be able to plan properly 
for the needs of Gladstone's people. Growth 
of population needs a corresponding growth 
in services and facilities. So far, the services 
and facilities have not been provided.
The current situation
The current situation in Gladstone is one 
where more and more people have to live in 
caravan parks. Some houses are being built, 
for example, the owners of the new smelter 
are building a considerable number of houses 
at Boyne Island. But these will only be made 
available to production workers when the
smelter starts to come on line. They are not 
available for the thousands of construction 
workers who make up the town's population 
at present.
And some people are cashing in on the 
housing shortage. Two-storey buildings are 
going up all over the place. The weekly rent 
for a unit is around $120, with a month's rent 
in advance and a $250 bond — the landlords 
don't want what they call "riff-raff".
In the pre-planning for the smelter, the 
unions proposed that houses be constructed 
prior to work commencing on the smelter, but 
no houses were made available. Following 
discussions with the constructors of the 
smelter, single mens's accommodation was 
provided for 100 workers and a caravan park 
was made available to accommodate 60 
people, but this was for a workforce which the 
company knew would peak at 1,700 plus 300 
or more employed in ancillary workshops 
around town.
Less than six months into construction, the 
company got into difficulties accommodating 
employees. A temporary camp was used to 
accommodate a further 50 workers, and 
negotiations took place with the Calliope 
Shire for more land to extend a temporary 
camp for another 150 workers.
The easy way out«for some companies is to 
pay the employee a $98 living-away-from- 
home allowance in place of free board and 
accommodation. But such a policy causes 
enormous hardships in the community. It 
forces up rents and other charges. And, of 
course, the companies always want to argue 
that the workers have "local status" since 
these workers are not entitled to any 
allowance. It is not easy to define a local in a 
community whose population increased 
nearly four times in fifteen years.
In 1980, a survey in Gladstone showed a 
majority of these interviewed thought 
accommodation, rents, the cost of living, 
transport, child care, recreation facilities, 
s c h o o l s  a n d  w o r k  a v a i l a b i l i t y  a l l  
unsatisfactory to very unsatisfactory.
Gladstone, like other towns affected by 
resources development, also offers few
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employment opportunities for women. Sexist 
attitudes prevail at all levels, including in the 
unions. Women are seldom considered for 
employment on construction or production.
Action
On March 4, 1981, I made the following 
statement to the Gladstone Observer:
We (the BWIU — H.H.) feel that all future 
major construction should be halted until 
such time as accommodation (houses, not 
caravans) and othe facilities are available, 
and a scheme is worked out to give more 
relief to local residents from high rents and 
other service charges.
Should the government refuse to co-operate, 
the Trades and Labor Council should call a 
stopwork meeting of all members of all 
unions on all projects and other workplaces 
in the Gladstone area, and also extend 
invitations to community groups and 
citizens to attend the meeting.
Such a gathering could be the beginning of a 
large protest movement demanding that the 
people's quality of life must come before so- 
called development.
Gladstone's mayor, Col Brown, responded:
Although 1 don 't  condone such action, it 
might be a definite means of gaining 
attention from the governments.
He indicated that only a short time before 
he would have considered such a call for 
action irresponsible, but lack of response 
from both state and federal governments had 
changed that.
The mass meeting took place on July 1. A 
public debate preceded the meeting. It was 
advertised through the distribution of 5,000 
leaflets and a half-page advertisement in the 
local press.
The resolution before the meeting said:
This meeting of Gladstone workers resolves 
to ban any further major construction in the 
Gladstone environment until assurances are 
given by state and federal governments and 
companies that adequate tinance will be 
made available to overcome infrastructure
and community service needs of the area to 
the satisfaction of the executive of the 
Trades and Labor Council of Queensland in 
consultation with the project unions and the 
Gladstone Trades and Labor Council.
Major projects shall be defined from time to 
time by the executive of the Trades and 
L a b o r  C o u n c i l  o f  Q u e e n s l a n d ,  in  
consultation with the project unions and the 
Gladstone Trades and Labor Council,  
having regard to the capital cost and to the 
impact any resultant labor force increase, 
construction and /o r  operations, would have 
on the Gladstone social structure.
The mass stopwork meeting was called by 
the Queensland Trades and Labor Council, 
with the support of the Australian Workers 
Union, the Gladstone Provincial Trades and 
Labor Council, the Council of Australian 
Government Employee Organisations and 
almost forty individual unions. It was held in 
the showground — the former emergency 
caravan park.
The people in Gladstone know from 
experience the shortcomings and lack of 
facilities in their town. In 1972, the National 
Times has described Gladstone as: “A slum 
with the world's biggest alumina plant". Until 
now, however, many residents have felt 
unable to do anything effective. They are 
aware of the awesome wealth and power of 
the companies — including offshoots of such 
multinationals as Kaiser of the United States, 
Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation of the United 
Kingdom, and Sumitomo of Japan. There 
have been divisions, of greater or lesser 
degree, among the community — between 
workers and others, between "locals" and 
workers from elsewhere.
Mass meeting
The Ju ly  m eeting  may well have 
transformed that situation. It brought 
together workers from virtually all jobs and 
callings: a group of hotel service workers 
stood alongside a knot of workers who had 
come straight from the smelter construction 
site. About 4,000 people were present. Labor 
Council president, Harry Hauenschild, who 
chaired the meeting, called it "a historic 
gathering".
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Union speakers stressed that they do not 
oppose development, but they are against 
a n y t h i n g  w h i c h ,  in  t h e  n a m e  o f  
"development" worsens the lifestyle or the 
e n v iro n m e n t ,  o r  b o th ,  o f  the local 
communities. They oppose multinationals 
which take huge sums in profits out of the 
community but allocate only relatively minor 
and quite inadequate amounts to meet the 
needs which their operations have created.
The first speaker, a metalworker from the 
powerhouse, was against the motion, he saw it 
as a threat to jobs. The next speaker, who had 
come to Gladstone from Western Australia, 
was also against. Then others spoke. A 
construction worker in a Jackie Howe singlet 
told of the effects of caravan life and other 
conditions:
M um suffers, the kids suffer and dad is glad 
to get away from it for eight hours a day at 
work.
He said that the multinationals were 
affecting Australia.
So let's do something about it; it's our 
bloody country. Vote for your own future, 
the futures of your wives and kids. Vote for 
Australia.
It came eventually to the time to vote. 
There was to be a count if the voting was at all 
in doubt. In fact, a forest of hands, 
thousands of them, were raised in favor of the 
motion; a mere sprinkling of hands was 
against.
The workers, fed up with social inequality, - 
decided overwhelmingly to be part of the 
decision-making process on development in 
the area. Wherever union members gathered 
after the meeting — in the pubs, in the street, 
and back on the jobs, there was animation 
and jubilation. And this spirit flowed through 
to other sections of the community. There was 
a feeling that, after years-long frustrations 
and exasperations, something decisive was 
now on the agenda which could compel action 
to end the notoriously dismal housing 
situation and other social conditions, in what . 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen has audaciously
called "the glamor development area of 
Australia".
The mass meeting was a first step, but a big 
step. Consultations will be held with the 
whole community to ensure a concerted and 
co-ordinated common effort. Co-operation 
will be sought from governments and the 
companies.
Press reaction
Next day the Gladstone Observer, in its 
editorial, said:
The revolution has come.
Gladstone is a city in revolt.
T h e  G la d s to n e  w o rk e rs  w ho  v o ted  
overwhelmingly at a mass meeting yesterday 
to ban major construction work until the 
city gets aid have issued governments and 
big companies alike with the final 
ultimatum.
The ultimatum is simply this: Pay up or stay 
out.
The problems of boom city have long been 
aired in the national media. The boom has 
brought big companies to Gladstone in 
search of big profits but the rapid influx of 
workers has also placed big burdens on 
lo c a l  f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  a m e n i t i e s  a n d  
dramatically forced up the cost of living. 
Accommodation rentals have gone through 
the roof, real estate prices have skyrocketed, 
rates have soared, and social welfare 
facilities have been strained to  the limit and 
beyond.
The cost of living in boom city has prompted 
many people to label it "doom city", forced 
lower income earners and pensioners to 
head for the hills. Local residents have 
complained about the industrial pollution 
problem and conservationists have warned 
that worse is yet to come.
The description is apt. While the revolution 
hasn't arrived, a further comment from the 
Observer sums up the attitude of Gladstone's 
workers:
But at the very least, their actions will serve 
as a gesture of disenchantment, a symbol 
that a boom is only a boom when all reap the 
benefits.
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SHOP FLOOR 
ORGANISATION
Some experiences from the vehicle industry1
by Gerry Phelan
i>
For wage- and salary-earners involved in 
vehicle assembly, class is not a dead issue. It 
does not present itself as an intellectual 
p ro b le m , as a m a t te r  o f  the nice 
determination of class boundaries, and it is 
not a subject that would normally be 
discussed over lunch. Rather does class 
present itself as an expression of the 
experience of living human beings. That 
„ experience is a day-by-day event, five days a 
.v'C'0' week, of routine activity which yields a pay 
packet which in turn gives them access to life, 
to the pleasures outside work. In a normal 
working day the dominant activity is work, 
preparing for work and travelling to and from c 
work. There is little choice about the work: 
what is done is done for others, the way they 
want it, at the quality and at the rate they set.
For an assembler, there’s no room for 
creativity. The mind is separated from the 
body. Doing the job requires the body not the 
mind, and so the mind just exists. There are 
times though, in some of these routine days, 
when the mind does link up with the body. At 
such times, for those involved, mind and body 
become alive — the plant becomes alive. It is 
an industrial action that the two are fused.
The power of the employer is felt in the 
daily work-routine and felt just as much when 
industrial action is being used to improve 
some aspect of that routine. There is some 
power up there, and the workers don’t have it. 
That is to say, normally they d o n ’t have it. But 
when, collectively, the workers become 
determined to change something, they 
become powerful. Power then is, apparently, 
a conditional thing. It resides where it does 
because everybody concerned considers it 
right and proper that it should. It is a 
collection of daily practices and thoughts 
about these practices which express the class 
character of the relations between those 
involved in the vehicle industry.
The object of this essay is to detail some of 
the specifics of class relations2 and to 
highlight the importance of workers’ 
organisation on the shop-floor as a flexible 
and effective tool in their mediation. The 
focus throughout will be on the people at the 
workshop floor to try to understand 
something of their daily working life and 
some of the responses they make to it. Other 
important details will be mentioned only
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where they serve tha t purpose. Therefore little 
attention will be paid to the structure of the 
industry or the manner in which the main 
working-class institutions (the trade unions) 
interact at the state or federal level with the 
employers inside or outside the Arbitration 
Commission.
II
The o v e r - r id in g  m an a g e m e n t  c o n ­
sideration in vehicle-manufacturing and 
assembly plants is that actual production 
should meet the targeted production level on 
any given day. It is the target level in 
combination with the division of labour 
which is the bane of existence of the vehicle 
assembler. The assembly line, which usually 
attracts the blame for the problems of the 
industry, is merely the scapegoat. By focusing 
on the technology of the line attention is 
diverted away from the social system of the 
factory, of who controls whom to do what, 
when and how. The assembly line, which is a 
te ch n o log ica lly  p r im it iv e  m echan ism , 
facilitiates that control. It does so by precisely 
locating, and limiting the mobility of, the 
assembly workers within the plant and 
specifying the universal minimum rate at 
which they work. The target affects workers 
in the manufacturing plants too. For 
example, the target at Broadmeadows 
determines the daily output of the presses 
producing sheet-metal body panels miles 
away at F o rd ’s Geelong plant. A loaded train 
leaves Geelong each night to arrive at 
Broadmeadows by the following morning. 
One plant is dominated by assembly lines and 
the other is not.
The target
Both are dominated by the target. The 
power of the target is not confined to the 
plants of the major companies. The vehicle 
industry is characterised by a large number of 
sm a ll  s a te l l i t e  c o m p a n ie s  s u p p ly in g  
components to the industry such as wheel 
rims, wiring harnesses and bumper bars. 
Although they may be geographically remote 
from the assembly plants the target reaches 
out and touches them too.
The greater the division of labour the
smaller the task; the smaller the task the 
smaller the amount of time needed to 
complete it and the faster the assembly line 
can be driven. But with smaller tasks more 
people are needed to produce the finished 
article hence greater division of labour, faster 
line speeds, longer lines, larger workforces 
and bigger factories tend to go together. And 
so it is that at Broadmeadows in Victoria 
some 3300 people, typically, produce some 
350 vehicles per day on a job-cycle time of 
about l '/2 minutes whereas a t the West 
Heidelberg plant of Renault some 450 people 
produce about 40 vehicles per day, on a job- 
cycle time of about 15 minutes. The division 
of labour and the de-skilling of the worker 
tend to go together with two effects:
(i) The education level of new employees is 
lowered, thereby broadening the unskilled 
base from which the employer can find “spare 
parts” to labour on the assembly line.
(ii) The more these processes occur the wider 
the scope for the introduction of industrial 
robots.
Skill and responsibility
At the same time, there is a contradictory 
tendency :  the  c o m p a n ie s ’ m a rk e t in g  
strategies, in widening the range of vehicles 
and increasing the number of options 
available, mean that in any one eight-hour 
shift a line worker could be required to install 
quite different items of equipment on to one 
of several basic vehicle models. Hence there is 
an increasing need for alertness and flexibility 
on the part of the employee, and in these 
circumstances the VBU, the union which has 
coverage of most of the workers in the 
industry, has been successful in having the 
F ed e ra l  C o n c i l ia t io n  and  A rb i t r a t io n  
Commission (CAC) accept the argument that 
such factors have “required increased skill 
and responsibility in the work of assemblers, 
w e l d e r s  a n d  m e t a l  f i n i s h e r s ” . 3
With the introduction of a new model the 
employees experience the following three 
phases of the drive to achieve the target with 
each phase producing its own particular 
pressures: phase 1, the drive for volume; 
phase 2, the drive for quality; phase 3 the drive 
for efficiency.
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Initially the work force has to learn how the 
new model goes together and what the parts 
look like. During this learning period the 
main requirement is to see that completed 
vehicles come off the line, that is, “to get 
volume”.
As the new model is introduced the 
foremen/forewomen will be required to work 
out how the work of their sections can be 
performed and how many employees they’ll 
need to do it. While car bodies are coming 
down the line it will be the task of the leading 
hands to instruct the line workers how to do 
their respective jobs. If the line workers d o n ’t 
speak English (or the language of the leading 
hand) then the instruction proceeds by way of 
signs and gestures. There are many workers in 
the industry who speak little or no English. 
The VBU has been concerned about the issue 
and has been pressing the vehicle companies 
for the past five years to provide paid time off 
work for employees to learn English. The 
companies continue to refuse the claim. It was 
only last year that agreement was reached 
and then with only some of the companies, 
that international safety symbols be used in 
Australian vehicle plants. Apart from the 
importance of English for safe-working, let 
alone the essentially human aspect of being 
able to speak to, and understand the people 
around you, the multiplicity of vehicle 
options now available means that the cars 
coming down the line won’t all be exactly the 
same. The particular differences will need to 
be read by the line-worker from the 
computer-printed job  card attached to each 
car. An inability to read English could mean 
that a foreman/ woman would have to re­
allocate his/her staff and perhaps upset work 
routines and work relationships that have 
taken some time to develop. If the 
forem an/wom an has no English-reading 
employee who can be switched he/ she will try 
to obtain one from another section. But 
employees are often reluctant to go to a new 
section in surroundings that are new to them 
under the control of supervisors they may not 
know. Perhaps more importantly, they will be 
required to achieve almost immediately, and 
maintain for the entire shift, the level of
output of the other workers in front of and 
behind them in the production process. While 
for some employees, being switched to a new 
job, perhaps in a different section, would be a 
welcome relief, for others it only adds to the 
pressure and is therefore resisted.
Whereas in phase 1 the object is to obtain 
finished vehicles, during phase 2 much more 
attention is paid to the quality to the finish 
produced. Phase 3, the drive for “efficiency” is 
the speed-up phase. This is the period when 
the time-and-motion-study men arrive at the 
shop floor with stopwatch in hand. Their task 
is to reduce the number of employees without 
losing volume or quality. To call it efficiency 
is a bad joke. Assuming corporate optimism 
about the trend of vehicle sales, corporate 
profits depend on two main factors: 1) having 
the productive capacity to meet demand; 2) 
reducing costs of production wherever 
possible.
Productive capacity cannot be achieved 
overnight. There are long lead times involved 
in the design, construction, testing, and 
installation of new production equipment. 
Any particular plant management might not 
be able to do much about updating the plant’s 
productive capacity; such expenditure might 
have to take its place in the global carve-up of 
corporate funds. But where the local 
management can make its contribution to 
global profit is in reducing the labour content 
of its cost of production. In other words, 
they’re stuck with the plant but they can 
off-load the workers! And tha t’s where the 
time-and-motion-study people come in.
Reducing the cost of production is not 
confined to them. In the design departments 
of the corporation, engineers are continually 
searching for ways to use less labour and less 
capital in the production of a car. And they 
are successful. When Chrysler’s Valiant was 
in full production at the Tonsley Park plant in 
Adelaide in the 1960s it was taking something 
of the order of 70 hours to produce a complete 
car. As the fuel crisis began to bite and buyers 
showed an increasing preference for smaller 
four-cylinder cars Chrysler began to produce
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the Centura, then the Sigma, from the same 
plant. But the materials used in production 
and the way they could be assembled meant 
that the Sigma could be produced in 
approximately 25 hours. Production time for 
the Colt is expected to go down to 19l/i hours. 
By being in the plant for less time, each 
completed vehicle in 1981 uses much less of 
the manufacturer’s capital stock and labour 
than it did in 1965. The jobs are simpler and 
can be done much more quickly.
Ill
In an assembly plant there is a marked 
contrast between the situations faced by those 
working on moving production lines and 
those faced by the skilled tradesmen such as 
electricians and fitters who maintain the 
plant. The contrast is especially evident where 
these latter employees are involved in 
modifications to tooling.
The need for such modifications will 
u sua lly  becom e ev iden t th ro u g h  the 
inspection system which will reveal, for 
example, some unsatisfactory fit between 
body panels, involving the assembler on the 
line in spending more than the allotted time 
for the job, thus crowding the employee on 
the next work station. A white-collar 
d raughtsm an/w om an and a blue-collar fitter 
would soon be put onto the job; a 
forem an/wom an would not normally be 
present. In the interests of keeping close 
control over the work of each employee and 
thereby ensuring that the work was being 
done  as eff ic ien tly  as poss ib le  the 
forem an/wom an could, of course, instruct 
the skilled workers to do the job  in a certain 
way. The responsibility for it would shift then 
to the forem an/w om an leaving the workers 
with little freedom to plan.
The degree of freedom has important 
im p lic a t io n s  fo r  b o th  em ployee  and  
employer. For the employee it allows him /her 
to put h is/her own order onto his/her own 
particular job, to exhibit to himself/herself at 
least h is/her particular skills. The job  is 
h is/her domain and he/ she is the controller in 
that domain. This is in marked contrast to 
h is/her role as servant in any other relations
he/she has with the employer. The role of 
servant, the do-as-you’re-told role, is clear 
from the moment he/she walks past the 
employer’s security guard at the gate as 
he/she enters the plant in the morning.
From  the time he/she punches the Bundy 
clock he/she is “theirs” to do with as “they” 
please. Never mind the purpose of what 
he/she is asked to do, never mind whether or 
not it makes sense, just do it. “Their” plant, 
“their” rules. But his/her job , h is/her rules. 
T h a t’s different!
Perhaps this is hardly worth becoming 
excited about. After all, when the fitter lifts 
h is/her head he/she will be aware again that 
he/ she is in a plant of a multi-national vehicle 
producer and his/her degree of freedom will 
appear pitifully small. Nevertheless, as shown 
earlier, it will be more than the production 
line worker has!
IV
For the employer, any freedom the 
employee has in the doing of the job  lessens 
the employer’s control over the operation of 
the entire plant. From the employer’s point of 
view the employee might, in exercising 
h is/her degree of freedom, actually perform 
his /her job  in the least costly way but on the 
other hand he/ she might not. The uncertainty 
surrounding the question can be lowered by 
re d u c in g  the  am ount of w o rk  and  
constraining the kin d  of work the employee is 
required to perform. This implies both the 
substitution of machine tools for human 
labour and the simplification of production 
machinery so that defective parts are not 
repaired but are simply scrapped and 
replaced. Taking the above course might not 
be the least costly from the employer’s point 
of view but it does increase the predictability 
of, and thus the employer’s control over, the 
plant-wide operation. The implications of 
predictability for budgeting, for materials 
supply, for production scheduling, for 
delivery of finished vehicles to new-car 
salesrooms and ultimately for cash flow and 
for profit are obviously important.
A side  f ro m  the t e c h n ic a l /e c o n o m ic
14 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 78
implications considered above there are 
industrial/ political implications of employees 
having any freedom to move about the plant, 
which are even more important to the 
employer. Such freedom could be the basis on 
which events such as lunch-time union mass 
meetings are organised, and from which could 
flow interruptions to production far more 
serious and far more unpredictable than any 
deriving from the technical considerations 
mentioned earlier. The experience gained by 
the workers in engaging in on-the-job 
collective action is invaluable in shaping the 
way they handle future industrial problems 
with the employer. The employer, of course, 
realises this and does whatever he/she can do 
prevent such experience being gained.
V
The “Gnatenko case” illustrates some of the 
points from the previous sections. Fedor 
(Ted) Gnatenko, at the time of the incident 
described below was a tool-maker at GM H, 
Elizabeth, South Australia, and had been 
employed by the company for over 20 years. 
He was sacked on 20 November 1974 for 
taking part in an unauthorised union meeting 
at the plant on the same day. As with most 
industrial disputes this d idn’t arise “out of the 
blue” but was one of the more visible 
manifestations of a continuing series of 
events.
The principal element in the situation was 
probably the fact that in the latter half of 1974 
motor vehicle sales were sluggish. By the 
middle of October, Elizabeth workers 
reckoned GM H had 40,000 vehicles “on the 
grass”. In these circumstances one obvious 
move would have been for the company to 
lay-off production workers. While this had 
often been done in the industry, it was a move 
which always brought much political 
disfavour and soured relations with the 
unions, both officially and at the plant-floor. 
A better move from the com pany’s point of 
view would have been for some group of 
workers to go on strike. But how can an 
employer precipitate a strike? Sacking a 
leading shop-floor activist is one way. The 
strike (which would be almost certain to
follow) would provide the pretext for laying- 
off a large number of workers. This way the 
blame would be shifted and, moreover, 
another opportunity would be created to set 
the unions squabbling amongst themselves. 
This was the better strategy, but to analyse it 
requires some understanding of the pattern of 
u n io n i s m  in th e  i n d u s t r y  a n d  th e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  f o r m s  o f  c o n f l i c t  
accommodation created by the State. Thus 
we will be looking at the situation at three 
inter-penetrating levels: the relations in 
production4 relations between the union 
organisations and the industrial arbitration 
bodies.
Ted Gnatenko
The company had plenty of scope for a 
sacking: some 1500 workers had attended the 
November 20 meeting and of course 
Gnatenko was amongst them. He was unique. 
As convenor of the AM WU shop-stewards he 
was co-ordinator of stewards activities in a 
union which organised at the shop level 
around a strong shop-stewards system. His 20 
years of working for the company, his 
continuous involvement in union activities 
both on and off the job  and his some-time 
membership of the Communist Party of 
Australia meant he was a man of considerable 
relevant experience. Being convenor of the 
AMWU brought him into contact with shop- 
stewards of other unions on the job and 
amonst them and their members he was 
widely-known, popular and highly respected. 
In addition, his being Bulgarian by birth with 
a fluency in several languages made him 
someone who could, and did, communicate 
with many of the foreign-born workers who 
made up the bulk of the assembly-line work­
force.
So from the com pany’s point of view 
Gnatenko’s sacking could have been expected 
to produce a strike by certain key workers. It 
was more than possible, too, that, by making 
Gnatenko the target, his standing in the shop 
would lead to strong feelings by the VBU 
production workers and members of the other 
trades’ unions, that they should show 
solidarity with the AM W U and go out too. 
Moreover, if his sacking could be made to
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stick the company would be well rid of a most 
capable unionist.
The second element in the situation points 
up the complexity of inter-union relations 
and the tensions with which the workers at the 
plant had to deal; nevertheless it is difficult to 
estimate the degree to which events were 
influenced by it. In March 1974 tool-and- 
cutter grinders, members of the Australasian 
Society of Engineers (ASE) and the AMWU 
employed by G M H at Fishermen’s Bend in 
Victoria, struck for about a month in support 
of a claim for increased wages. In 
consequence, VBU members on production 
in the Body Assembly division at Elizabeth 
were stood-down for about three weeks. 
During May and June members of the 
Electrical Trades Union (ETU) at Elizabeth 
struck for about six weeks in support of a 
wage claim. Again VBU members at 
Elizabeth were stood down, this time for 
about four weeks. In other words, VBU 
members lost seven weeks pay because ot 
disputes they were not involved in and from 
which they could receive no benefit.
Following these events some VBU officials 
began agitating for a closed shop agreement, 
ie that all workshop employees should be 
members of the VBU. When the Gnatenko 
sacking took place it would have been 
reasonable to expect that at the very least 
there would have been a plant-wide strike of 
AMWU members. Again VBU members 
would have been stood down and again would 
have lost money. The Gnatenko sacking 
involved the important issue of victimisation. 
Nevertheless it is possible that some VBU 
officials were keen to be rid of a situation in 
which, with their union the biggest in the 
industry and potentially the most powerful, it 
was seen to be, particularly by the members, 
the most quiescent. One way to bring this to a 
head, which would have led to very 
substantial financial and other long-term 
gains for the VBU, would have been to let the 
expected AM W U strike over Gnatenko run 
its course. At its conclusion VBU officials 
would use the lost wages of their members to 
mobilise a VBU strike around the demand
that the company recognise the VBU as the 
sole union in the industry, and until that was 
achieved there would be no return to work.
The third element in the series of events 
surrounding Gnatenko’s sacking is more 
directly tied in to the com pany’s production 
planning. The workers at Elizabeth had 
become concerned at what they understood to 
be a company decision to phase-out 
production of the Australian-made Torana 
and launch instead a Japanese-made car, the 
Gemini. The vehicle would be manufactured 
in Japan  and imported to Australia in a 
completed knocked down (CKD) form, ready 
for local assembly. From normally reliable 
sources in senior management the workers 
reckoned that, across Australia, 5000 
employees would lose their jobs if the 
com pany’s plans went ahead. Gnatenko was 
quoted as saying that “ 1000 workers might go 
from Elizabeth”.5 On this issue the company 
had done nothing to allay the workers’ fears. 
Rather than scotch the rumours altogether, 
its officials told a meeting of Elizabeth 
shop-stewards that “only 15,000cars” 6 would 
be imported, not 50,000 as the workers 
thought. In addition, they gave “only vague 
replies to union enquiries concerning 
employment after Christmas”.7 
Plant Committee
It was against the foregoing background 
th a t  the C o m b in ed  S h o p  S te w a rd s ’ 
Committee representing members of the 
VBU, the Federated Engine Drivers and 
Firemen’s Association (FED FA ) and the 
AMWU called a lunch-time meeting of all 
members on November 20th to discuss the 
e m p l o y m e n t  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  
introduction of the Gemini. About 1500 
workers turned up to the lawn area within the 
plant, the place where mass meetings were 
usually held. Also present were officials of 
both the VBU and the AMW U. Before the 
meeting Gnatenko was warned by a company 
official that if the meeting were to take place 
he would face serious consequences; he was 
requested to call the meeting off. His response 
was that the decision to hold the meeting was 
made by more than 50 stewards on the shop 
committee (of which he was but one) and any
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decision to cancel would have to be taken by 
either that committee or the mass meeting 
itself. It went ahead and the first item of 
business was a report on the com pany’s 
warning to Gnatenko; the second was the 
question of where the rest of the meeting 
should be held.
It was moved and seconded from the floor 
and unanimously decided that the meeting 
should proceed forthwith right where it was. 
After some discussion the meeting adjourned 
without any decision being reached. At 3.30 
that same afternoon Gnatenko was sacked. 
The following morning an 8 am stopwork 
meeting of the A M W U ’s 400 members at 
Elizabeth decided to stop work for 24 hours in 
protest. For the unions involved the issue was 
serious since it could flow to all G M H ’s 
operations in Australia.
It put the workers at Elizabeth, and more 
particularly the AM W U members, in a 
powerful, but politically and industrially 
difficult, position. Nevertheless the support of 
the A M W U ’s official apparatus for the shop 
committee was strong with the SA state 
secretary, John  Scott, asserting, following the 
24-hour strike, that “the shop committee 
would be organising whatever follow-up 
action was required”.8 Nevertheless the 
matter was not left entirely with them. Two 
days after the sacking Scott filed an 
application in the South Australian Industrial 
Commission for G natenko’s reinstatement 
and engaged a QC to present the case. On the 
same day the union held a lunchtime meeting 
of its 200 members at the com pany’s 
Woodville, Adelaide plant. By this time the 
Minister for Labour and Industry in South 
Australia, M r McKee, had said publicly that 
he hoped Gnatenko would be reinstated and 
that “it (was) natural for people in the 
industry to want to discuss matters 
concerning their future, and one would not 
have expected the company to take such 
drastic action over a lunchtime meeting in 
view of the problems confronting the 
industry”.9
The com pany’s position was clear too; the 
union had been told that “Gnatenko would 
not be reinstated in any circumstances”.10 The
com pany’s response to the union application 
was to apply to the Supreme Court for an 
order prohibiting the S.A. Industrial 
Commission from hearing the matter. The 
order was duly given on 21 January 1975 by 
Chief Justice Bray who referred the matter to 
the Full Court. Bray’s order was met with an 
immediate walk off the job  by 20 AM W U 
stewards at Elizabeth who met at the union’s 
city office the following morning and then 
demonstrated outside the Supreme Court. 
They sent the following resolution to Bray:
This emergency meeting of the G M H  
Elizabeth A M W U  shop stewards com m ­
ittee, meeting with the full approval 
o f  th e  S t a t e  C o u n c i l ,  r e g i s t e r s  its 
s t ro n g  p r o t e s t  a t  th e  a c t io n  th a t  
G M H  management has decided to take 
to prevent the case of the dismissed 
A M W U  convenor Ted Gnatenko being 
heard by the State Industrial C om m ­
ission. On m a n y  occas io n s  an d  in 
relation to many issues in the past 
re p re se n ta t iv e s  o f  G M H  m a n a g e m e n t  
have urged us to take our case to arbit­
ration. On this issue, when that is pre­
cisely what we have done, the company is 
demonstrating its hypocrisy by taking every 
legal step to prevent the case from being 
heard and the question resolved speedily.11
Direct action
It was two months before the Full Court 
heard the matter and when it did, on 27th 
March, it decided in favour of GMH. With 
that decision AM W U members at Elizabeth
and Woodville re-introduced an industrial 
tactic they had used so successfully betore — 
the “guerilla” strike.12 The direct action began 
on Wednesday, 9th April, when 22 workers 
from the maintenance, jig, body and welding 
sections at Elizabeth went out at noon on 
what they said was an indefinite strike. At 2 
pm that same day 12 workers in the tool 
sharpening area at Woodville walked off the 
job. Contrary to expectations strikers from
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both plants returned to work the following 
m o rn in g .  On th e  10th A pril ,  th ree  
maintenance fitters walked off the job  at 
Elizabeth when two assembly lines broke 
down. The company thereupon stood down 
130 production workers (VBU members) and 
had no idea when the conveyors might be 
repaired. The fitters decided to do repairs on 
the night shift of the same day so the Vehicle 
Assembly Plant (VAP) could begin work at 
the normal starting time of 7.30 am the next 
day. A joint meeting of stewards from the 
VBU, AM W U and F E D F A  was held on the 
10th April and endorsed the metal workers’ 
actions. While all these actions were being 
discussed and decided on at the shopfloor 
level, the State branches of the various unions 
were indicating their support. For example, 
the walk-off by the three AMW SU 
maintenance fitters on 10th led to the 
company’s approaching the VBU to see 
whether that union would allow any of its 
fitter members on night shift to do repairs 
normally done by AM W U men. The VBU 
refused and the VBU State executive pledged 
its support and endorsed the actions of the 
AM W U in its efforts to get Gnatenko 
reinstated. The State officials of the ASE, the 
rival union to the AMW U, also rejected the 
com pany’s approach.
Shop-floor action
In the face of this build-up of shop-floor 
action and inter-union support the company 
continued to maintain its November 1974 
firmness. Notices posted in the Elizabeth 
plant on the 10th April said: “The company 
has again advised the AM W U that it will not 
enter into any discussion regarding the re­
instatement of M r Gnatenko.”13
As the dispute proceeded the workers at the 
shop-floor continued to disrupt production. 
They were not prepared to be fobbed off by 
company declarations that it would not talk. 
They had won against similar attitudes by 
GM H in the past. They also knew that as this 
struggle moved into the courtroom and out of 
their hands, it would be particularly 
important to let their feelings be known. 
There is considerable feeling throughout 
much of Australia’s trade union movement
that decisions in court rooms reflect the 
power struggle in the office or plant. This is 
not to say that decisions of Industrial Courts 
or Commissions are irrelevant — far from it! 
It is rather to acknowledge that, often, justice 
is a matter of power. The aim of the shop- 
floor disruption was to get the company to 
talk. At the time of the Gnatenko sacking 
there existed in the Award a stand-down 
clause which provided that “The Company 
shall have the right to deduct payment for any 
day an  employee cannot be usefully employed 
because of a strike or through a breakdown in 
machinery or a stoppage of work by any cause 
for which the Company cannot reasonably be 
held responsible”.14
Lightning strikes
This could have been expected to be a brake 
on industrial action but, in practice, as the 
following section makes clear, the workers at 
the shop floor found a way around the clause. 
The main tactic was the short-duration, on- 
the-job, lightning strike first in one section of 
the plant then in another; as one group 
resumed work another would stop. A typical 
incident would be as follows: the four VBU 
members spot welding in the side-gates 
section would fail to resume work after the 
morning tea break and would stay off the job 
for about two hours, ie at 11.30 am they 
would re-appear, pick 'up their welding guns 
and set to work. While they were off the job 
their workmates down-the-line from them 
could continue to work until stocks were 
exhausted and then they would stop too. 
When the welders returned perhaps two or 
three painters in the spray painting booth 
would leave the job, and the line feeding them 
would have to stop. The production 
superintendent had no idea which section 
would be on strike next, for how long or how 
many employees would be involved. Because 
those who were on strike, and those who had 
no materials to work with did not actually 
leave the plant they were able to circulate 
amongst the other workers and tell them what 
was happening. All this added to the high 
level of co-ordination between the shop 
stewards in the various sections and made for 
the constant monitoring and review of the
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situation by the workers. The effects of this 
sort of industrial action on production were 
severe. Although this form of action had been 
determined by the combined shop committee 
involving both production and maintenance 
workers, it did not lend itself wholly to 
centralised co-ordination by the combined 
shop committee executive. The VBU stewards 
were m uch  m ore  fa m il ia r  th a n  the 
maintenance stewards with the way the 
process of production was integrated, and 
therefore knew the strategic points, and so 
they were given the authority of the combined 
shop committee to plan and set the strikes in 
motion.
Thirty per cent Over-award
This form of action was not new to the 
workers at Elizabeth. In the early 1970s they 
had launched a campaign to force GM H t o  
convert the existing over-award payments, 
into an all-purpose rate and to remove all the 
penalties attached to these over-award 
payments.15 This campaign became known as 
the 30 per cent over-award campaign, and the 
series of lightning stoppages resulted in not 
one completed vehicle coming off the 
assembly line for the whole of one working 
week. Vehicles came off the line, on wheels, 
with engines in, but each one had parts 
missing, enough to prevent it going to the 
dealer’s sale room. In this period the lightning 
strikes were being staged all over the plant but 
the particular circumstances of each work 
section required that tactics be tailored to 
suit. For example, in the VAP the situation 
was different from other sections, because 
there, bodies could be stockpiled off the line 
on trolleys and could be pushed onto the line 
if there was an interruption to production in 
the body building area or the paint shop, for 
example. This meant the VAP could be kept 
going independently of these other lines. 
Because the VAP was working two shifts at 
this time, ie a day and an afternoon shift, there 
was every chance that the workers on day shift 
could deplete the entire stock of bodies thus 
making it unnecessary for the workers on the 
afternoon shift to clock on. It was here, 
especially, that the workers were in danger of 
giving the company the chance to use the
stand-down clause.
As mentioned above, if, at the time a new 
shift was to begin, there were insufficient 
materials available to keep the shift going for 
the eight hours, the company could decline to 
start them. The stewards in the other shops 
therefore had to ensure that on any particular 
day, there was enough body stock available 
for the VAP afternoon shift to start and in 
addition, if they put on a lightning strike, 
there would still be enough stock for the 
following day’s day-shift to start. This all 
required a good knowledge of the production 
process and a nice balance between the needs 
of stock buildup and the effects of industrial 
action. But they did it, for a week — 
everybody employed and no saleable vehicles 
produced! The workers who engaged in the 
lightning strikes had their wages docked by 
the company but on-the-job collections fixed 
that. Ultimately the campaign had the desired 
effect; the 1974 G M H  Award set a new 
standard in wages. The arbitrary nature of 
wage elements such as merit money and 
attendance bonus was eliminated by being 
written into the Award. No longer were these 
payments tied to whether or not the employee 
had kept h is/her nose clean with the 
foreman/woman. As such payments were 
formerly approximately 30 per cent of the 
weekly wage, to have them assured was a 
significant gain.
A shop-floor campaign
This campaign was important because it 
was initiated by workers at the shop-floor. 
The full-time officials soon came in behind it 
but because they did not actually work in the 
industry and therefore were not subject to the 
arbitrariness of the penalties they quite mis­
read the feeling of the membership in the run­
up to the 1974 Award negotiations. Whereas 
officials were pressing for Award wage 
increases in their discussions with the 
membership as to what should be in the log of 
claims, the membership was insisting that a 
priority claim was that the penalties had to go.
It was with this sort of experierce behind 
them that the workers at Elizabeth launched
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into their industrial action to have Gnatenko 
reinstated. They realised it would be a battle 
of wits as to whether or not they would lay 
themselves open to the com pany’s use of the 
stand-down clause. They realised it was just 
another weapon in the com pany’s industrial 
arsenal, which, like all the rest, would be used 
to divide, intimidate, cajole, entice or reward 
the workers and could be used whether or not 
the company had alternative work available. 
As can be seen from the 30 per cent campaign 
the shop floor workers demonstrated a 
com p reh en s iv e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  the 
production process and could be expected to 
offer an informed view of any company claim 
about available work. The acting secretary of 
the VBU at the time, Mr D Foreman, referred 
to  th e  s t a n d - d o w n  c l a u s e ’s c o n t r o l  
implications when on Friday, 11th April, he 
announced, with respect to the stand-down of 
130 workers on the previous day, “the union 
members dispute the company’s claim that 
they cou ld  no t  have been gain fu lly  
employed”.16 Foreman was giving notice 
that tne union would be lodging a claim in the 
Arbitration Commission for payment for the 
time stood down.
At this stage Mr Laurie Carmichael 
(Assistant National Secretary of the AM WU) 
asked M r Clyde Cameron (then Federal 
Minister for Labour) to arrange for a member 
of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission (CAC), to be made available to 
bring the parties together. Bringing in the 
Federal Government did make it that much 
more difficult for the company to continue to 
refuse to talk and siting the discussions in the 
CAC was consistent with the company’s 
original contention that the SA Industrial 
Commission had no jurisdiction and that the 
CAC was the appropriate forum.
T h e  p r o c e e d i n g s  b e g a n  b e f o r e  
Commissioner Clarkson in Adelaide on 
Monday, 14 April 1975, and continued for 
five days. On the Monday Clarkson directed 
G M H “to reconsider its refusal to discuss 
(Gnatenko’s) re-instatement”.17 On the 
following day more than 300 AMWU 
members at Elizabeth walked off the job  at 
8.30 am for a 24-hour strike, many of them
going to the CAC hearing to witness 
proceedings. On the Friday Clarkson varied 
the G M H  Award so as to enable employees 
covered by that Award to come under the re­
in s ta te m e n t  p ro v is ions  of  the  S o u th  
Australian Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act. 18 The variation was made 
retrospective to November 1st of the previous 
year, ie before Gnatenko was sacked. Two 
and a half weeks later, on May 8th, GM H 
appealed, and the very next day the A M W U ’s 
shop stewards in Elizabeth held a lunchtime 
meeting to discuss what they would do next.
Closer organisation
The recent events had broadened the 
dispute, and the unions were quick to see that 
Clarkson’s decision applied not only to 
Gnatenko but represented a significant 
advance for all G M H ’s employees. It 
constituted a turning point in that now all 
employees stood to lose if the com pany’s 
application was successful. Stewards from the 
VBU and FED FA  joined with AM W U 
stewards in a meeting a lunch-time on the 
following Monday, 12th May, outside the 
plant gates. In other words, at the shop-floor 
level workers from those three unions were 
moving back into a com bined  form of 
organisation. The lunch-time stewards’ 
meeting decided to send a delegation of 
stewards from th£ three unions to tell 
company officers that, because of the appeal 
being lodged, they could expect lightning 
strikes. The strikes followed while the 
newspapers were given, and published the 
Unions’case. Subsequently (March, 1976) the 
High Court rejected the G M H  appeal.
The purpose of this account has been to 
show some of the details of the day-to-day 
s i t u a t i o n  o f  b o th  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  
maintenance workers in the vehicle industry. 
The details will differ from plant to plant and 
company to company and will bear the marks 
of particular individuals but, by and large, the 
size of plants, the number of people involved, 
the pressure of work and, particularly, the 
way the workforce is controlled, all operate 
to produce the kind of effects described.
Cases like Gnatenko’s or a 30 per cent
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c am p a ig n  d o n ’t bob  up every  day , 
nevertheless there is almost always some 
industrial matter at issue in the plant. Even 
for these smaller issues the workers are better 
able to handle them if they have some form of 
shop-floor organisation, some group of 
colleagues to whom, on the job, they can turn 
for advice and support, some group of 
co lleagues  in w hom  can  reside the 
accumulated wisdom of the p lant’s industrial 
experiences. A Gnatenko case makes the need 
for such an organisation even more 
compelling.
The ability and the preparedness of the 
shop-floor organisation to plan and act was 
the principal reason the Gnatenko sacking 
d idn’t stick. Another significant reason for 
the workers’ success was the extent to which 
the union officials supported the Elizabeth 
workers.
The implications of the situation of the
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1 The writer is indebted to many people. In particular
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production. 19 But such questions do not even 
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FOREIGN POLICY 
DEBATE
It may seem strange that Australian Left 
Review  should publish a speech made in the 
Australian Parliament by the Minister for 
Defence and a reply by the Leader of the 
Opposition, more especially because these 
speeches* were made several months ago. At 
the time they received little media coverage. 
Their importance lies in the fact that they 
represent a certain evolution in foreign policy 
discussion.
In his speech, M r Killen is conciliatory; 
there is an overwhelming impression that the 
government wants the opposition to maintain 
the traditional bi-partisan policy of support 
for the United States alliance and for 
ANZAS. The Minister agres with the Leader 
of the Opposition that, in certain conditions, 
some military installations, that is United 
States bases in Australia, could become 
military targets. He admits that the alliance 
m eans o u r  poss ib le  invo lv em en t  in 
which we would prefer not to be involved, and 
we cannot always expect to influence the 
United States to behave as we might wish. No 
one on the left would argue with this. But in 
the long run Mr. Killen continues to see the 
world as a contest between the two super 
powers with the United States carrying the 
burden for the free nations of the world. He 
asks M r Hayden, and presumably the 
electorate a t large, to judge the United States 
in terms of intent.
Mr. Killen’s views are a mirror image of 
those who place all their hopes for the future 
in the Soviet Union. If policies cannot be 
u n d e rs to o d  im m ed ia te ly  or  ex p la in ed  
satisfactorily, one is invited to have trust.
* The texts which follow have been edited and 
slightly abridged. The complete texts are in 
Hansard, May 5, 1981.
Mr Hayden, who had recently visited 
various United States bases and installations, 
expressed his reservations to parliament 
about the bases. His chief concern is the base 
at North-West Cape. He repeats a statement 
made earlier to the National Press Club that 
Australia has a sovereign right to ultimate 
control of affairs on her own territory, that 
the present arrangements covering North- 
West Cape are unsatisfactory and should be 
renegotiated. If the United States refused, Mr 
Hayden, without equivocation, pledged that 
the US would be asked by a future Labor 
government to wind down its operations.
Mr Hayden's speech reflects a growing 
disquiet as the United States moves towards a 
first strike nuclear capacity. He does not want 
Australian foreign policy options pre-empted 
or determined by the United States. He makes 
a plea for nuclear disarmament.
Hayden's views
Mr Hayden's views are still a long way from 
reflecting all the concerns of those who 
believe that all foreign bases should be 
removed and that the road to security requires 
a break with the US alliance in favor of non- 
alignment; it would be easy to dismiss the 
speech. Yet, for all its limitations, it represents 
a significant change. Foreign policy will not 
be reversed overnight, in any case, and foreign 
installations could not be removed at the 
stroke of a pen, even if there was a much wider 
acceptance of the dangers inherent in all such 
installations.
But each base and installation is the subject 
of a particular treaty and each treaty could, 
and should be reviewed instead of being 
automatically renewed. A genuine review of 
the treaty concerning North-West Cape could 
lead to wider consideration of all other bases. 
M r Hayden has called for an  informed and
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persistent discussion and debate in Australia 
in relation to American nuclear strategic 
policy and implications. A public review of all 
treaties would be one way to generate this 
debate.
Since May, when these speeches were 
made, further moves away from the former 
bi-partisan policy are evident. The Labor 
Opposition and the Democrats have opposed 
an Australian involvement in the United 
States-sponsored force for the Sinai, and a 
Labor Party defence policy, more in keeping 
with the genuine defence needs of an 
independent and non-aligned nation than one 
which depends on the United States, has been 
outlined.
Foreign policy
Of all the questions debated in the left, 
foreign policy receives the least detailed 
consideration. For the Labor Party as a 
whole, it is conventional wisdom that foreign 
policy is not a good election issue; indeed, 
foreign policy issues (it is thought), helped 
keep conservatives in office throughout the 
'50s and '60s. While it now seems ridiculous, a 
major electoral ploy of those times was to 
threaten the populace with "Chinese hordes", 
and it seemed to work. A majority in the 
community seemed to feel the need for great 
and powerful friends.
The Liberal-Country Party coalition has 
always argued for, and acted on, policies 
which tie Australia closely to the United 
States. The coalition, under various leaders, 
established the United States bases and 
installations, offered both volunteers and 
conscripts to aid American wars and planned 
a defence capability based on American 
military hardware. The latest examples of this 
policy are the granting of landing rights to B- 
52 bombers at Darwin, the offer of troops for 
the Sinai, and the proposed purchase of F-18 
Hornets. Based on this co-operation, the 
assumption has always been that, in times of 
need, the United States will reward her 
faithful ally with protection.
U ntil now, except of course as the Viet Nam 
war dragged on and opposition to Australia's 
involvement grew into a majority, Labor has 
generally concurred with this approach, if
somewhat uneasily.
Within the radical left, including within the 
Labor Party, moral positions have often been 
passed off as policy. Disregarding the fact 
th a t  m ost peo p le  in the  A u s t ra l ia n  
community believe there are external dangers 
a view which is generally misplaced but 
persists — the left often projects an "all or 
nothing" approach in its opposition to 
military bases and the US alliance. But 
opposition to foreign bases and the US 
alliance based on moral principles convinces 
very few. And the left, having recognised that 
much war hysteria is built on anti-communist, 
anti-Soviet and, in the past, anti-Chinese 
propaganda, often appeared merely as an 
apologist when it sought to counter these 
views.
In general the left can agree that most of the 
running in the arms race has been initiated by 
the U nited States and most of the proposals to 
diminish tension have come from the Soviet 
Union. But it should not give the impression 
that all blame lies with one side and all virtue 
with the other.
Another factor, which does not assist the 
credibility of the left when foreign policy is 
considered, is the tendency to "spend" defence 
allocations over and over on proposed 
hospitals, nursery schools, pensions, etc. This 
approach adds to the impression that 
opponents of traditional defence policies are 
unconcerned with the legitimate defence of 
Australia. That more money should be 
allocated to social services is not the issue, but 
proposals which sound like zero spending on 
armaments will never find acceptance. 
Indeed, one price of independence and non- 
a l ig n m en t  m ay be increased  defence 
spending.
Some efforts have been made to develop a 
coherent policy of independence and non- 
alignment, but the need for an adequate 
defence policy to back this foreign policy has 
hardly been raised until now. The concept of 
non-alignment has been bogged down in 
discussions of the nature of the non-aligned 
movement, as if to be non-aligned is to 
identify with every member of that 
very heterogeneous movement.
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The basis of non-alignment is to refuse to 
join either great power bloc. The key elements 
for a non-aligned Australia would be to end 
automatic acceptance of United States 
military policy, withdrawal from military 
pacts, and evidence that foreign military bases 
will be dismantled. When most of the bases 
and installations were established in Australia 
there was little public debate and even less 
information. In contrast, when landing rights 
for B-52s were established in 1981 there was 
much debate, considerable opposition and 
large protest actions in Darwin. While there 
are differing estimates on the role of 
installations such as Pine Gap, Nurrungar 
Smithfield and Omega, there is a growing 
understanding that all foreign bases limit 
sovereignty and invite nuclear retaliation.
CND campaign
This understanding has triggered off the 
massive European nuclear disarmament 
campaign. When United States military and 
political leaders indicated that limited nuclear 
war was u n d e r  c o n s id e ra t io n ,  m any  
Europeans understood that this is a policy 
which would put them in the front line. The 
concept of limited nuclear war is a fantasy 
since it assumes that the Soviet Union, a 
European power, would play the game 
according to some United States rule book. 
But the European movement has begun to 
demonstrate its opposition to all nuclear 
weapons systems and nuclear bases which 
make Europe a prime target. Australia may 
not be quite as vulnerable but the bases it 
hosts make it a target too. In Europe, most 
bases are in heavily populated areas, while 
those in Australia tend to be in isolated 
regions. Perhaps this explains why some of 
the more significant actions against foreign 
bases have centred on areas which perceive a 
distant threat — Darwin (the B-52 facility), 
Alice Spring (Pine Gap) and Adelaide 
(Smithfield).
Even if bases are not close to most cities, 
community awareness is growing that there is 
too much arms building in the world and an 
almost total absence of negotiations for
disarmament. In the run-up to the 1980 
US Presidential election the United States
refused to ratify SALT II (not a disarmament 
measure, but a useful aspect of the process of 
arms control). Since the election, President 
Reagan has embarked on a program to 
increase US nuclear capacity and the options 
for a "first strike" have been canvassed.
UN disarmament session
Some negotiations are planned for later this 
year and pressure for meaningful negotiations 
will increase as the United Nations prepares 
for its second special session on disarmament 
to be held in the middle of 1982. The Soviet 
Union has recently proposed that nuclear 
weapons states should sign a declaration 
prohibiting the use of such weapons, a change 
from an earlier position when it abstained 
from voting in the United Nations on a similar 
proposal. But the European disarmament 
movement is not relying on the goodwill of 
any nuclear power. It is developing against 
the deployment of the SS-20 missiles by the 
Soviet Union, and the planned deployment of 
new Pershing missiles, the Cruise, the Trident 
submarine and the manufacture of the 
neutron bomb.
In Australia, and the region, a diverse and 
independent movement is growing for a 
nuclear-free Pacific. The movement connects 
concerns over the arms race, the fact that 
nuclear weapons a n d / or delivery systems are 
tested in the region by the United States, the 
Soviet Union, France and China, the 
problems arising from nuclear power and 
nuclear-waste dumping and the mining of 
uranium which fuels the nuclear-weapons 
industry.
There is no easy route to disarmament; 
indeed, the enormity of the task immobilises 
many, but the debate reported here is an 
opening for all concerned Australians. In 
future issues of Australian Left Review  the 
discussion and debate will continue. Your 
views on how to achieve an independent 
Australian foreign policy and contribute to 
halting the arms race would be welcome.
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Joint A ustralian-U nited States 
Defence Facilities 
Mr. J. Killen, Minister for Defence
Honourable members will know that 
recently the Leader of the Opposition (Mr 
Hayden) spoke to the National Press Club 
about joint Australian-United States defence- 
related facilities in Australia and associated 
questions.
A good deal of the statement accords not 
only with my own views but also with views of 
Ministers over many years in governments 
from both sides of the House. I welcome and 
value this continuing bipartisanship in regard 
to these important matters. I welcome 
particu larly  the honourab le  m em b er’s 
statements about the facilities at Pine Gap 
and Nurrungar and that the requirements of 
his party’s policy are met at both facilities. 
The honourable members said: 'In certain 
conditions, industrial centres and military 
installations in Australia could — I repeat, 
could — become nuclear targets. Pine Gap 
and Nurrungar would be unlikely targets and, 
in our view, Smithfield not at all’. I agree with 
this assessment. The honourable member 
very properly reminded his listeners that he 
and his deputy were bound by the restrictions 
on public disclosure about the facilities at 
Pine Gap and Nurrungar. He went on, 
however, to say that much of those 
restrictions was part of ‘obsessive seCrecy’ 
surrounding these establishments.
I do not believe that the secrecy attaching to 
these facilities is obsessive. Why would this 
Government, or any other government, wish 
to maintain secrecy about the facilities when 
their position would be muich easier if there 
were no secrecy?
Given the basic accord between us 
regarding the facilities at Pine Gap, 
Nurrungar and Smithfield, I am more amazed 
that it is the facility at North West Cape — a 
naval relay station — that apparently causes 
my honourable friends difficulties. I wish to 
spend some time examining these difficulties,
which 1 believe to be lacking real substance. 
First, however, I wish to deal with a particular 
subject regarding the North West Cape 
station that has been raised in the Press. A 
newspaper recently, under the sensational 
headline ‘China, South Africa could use base 
to send war orders’ stated:
A secret treaty between Australia 
and the United States allows the 
North West Cape signals station in 
Western Australia to be used by any 
of W ashington’s allies without the 
Federal G overnment’s knowledge or 
consent.
This means Australia could become a 
naval command post in a Middle East 
war, a conflict between North and 
South Korea or even hostilities between 
China and the Soviet Union. If the 
Americans wished, the North West Cape 
station could be used by South Africa to 
send orders to  its navy.
Secret treaty
There is no secret treaty as stated in the 
Press. That is a fabrication. There is a 
document entitled ‘Agreed Minutes of 
Interpretation’. It is dated 9 May 1963 and 
was signed by the then Australian Minister 
for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, 
and the then United States Ambassador, Mr 
William Battle. The minutes are not ‘secret’. 
They are unclassified. The fact of their 
existence has been public knowledge since 21 
May 1963, when the then Minister for 
External Affairs affirmed their existence to 
the then Leader of the Opposition. Why the 
minutes were not tabled in the first place 1 do 
not know. It is clear enough that the reason 
they have not been tabled since is that their 
significance is purely formal. Let me deal with 
the first minute, which refers to Article 4 of 
the main agreement. The minute says:
Any use of the station by third 
countries would be a matter for agree­
ment between the two governments. 
However, communications originated 
by a third government and accepted into 
United States channels elsewhere than 
in Australia would be United States 
defence communications in the context
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of this agreement.
The minute deals with the use of the station 
by third countries. There was and is nothing 
new in this.
Before the Second World W ar Australia’s 
defence communications system was linked 
with the systems of the then British 
Commonwealth countries. During the war 
Australia became associated also with the 
United States communications network. It 
has remained so since. Through its 
association with the United States and United 
Kingdom communications systems, the 
Australian communications system has been 
associated with the communications systems 
of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
countries, to which the United States and 
United Kingdom are allied. There is nothing 
secret about this. It has been general public 
knowledge for decades.
Australia has received, as it continues to 
receive, the reciprocal advantage of world­
wide access to other parties’ communication 
facilities. When the North West Cape station 
was established, there was certainly no 
suggestion that this co-operation between 
allies should cease. Already in May 1962 the 
then Prime Minister told this House that the 
purpose of the station would be to provide 
radio communication for United States and 
allied ships over a wide area of the Indian 
Ocean and the Western Pacific. In March the 
following year, he stated that such use was 
intended for allied submarines as well as for 
allied surface ships.
For the sake of completeness, perhaps 1 
should add that the North West Cape station 
will also assist merchant ships in putting their 
messages into the civil network if they cannot 
themselves gain access to that network, or if 
they are in distress. That a NATO or New 
Zealand message might occasionally be 
transmitted through North West Cape does 
not seem to me objectionable.
Except in the broadest sense that members 
of the communications network are countries 
that share certain attitudes regarding global
strategic issues, use of facilities in a member 
country does not involve that country’s 
endorsement of the traffic through those 
facilities and related activities. Concern in 
that respect fails completely to comprehend 
how modern communications work. Once a 
message has been accepted into the system — 
and access is automatic for countries such as 
Australia which participate in the standing 
arrangements — it is normally handled by 
computers rather than individuals, and sent 
to its destination with little or no human 
intervention. The actual route taken by a 
particular message could be traced only 
afterwards, not predicted before or detected 
at the time. In large, sophisticated, highly 
automated highfrequency networks like the 
US defence communications system and 
those of its allies, messages are not necessarily 
transmitted by the shortest route but by the 
speediest and most reliable. Deliberately 
created redundancies in the system mean that 
there are a substantial number of alternative 
routes available. So even the originators of 
the message, let alone other countries, do not 
know how it might be relayed.
VLF communication
1 want to say a few words about very low 
frequency communications to submarines. 
Third countries’ use of North West Cape’s 
very low frequency transmission without 
Australian knowledge or consent would be 
possible only if the third country had suitable 
reception equipment and also access to US 
cryptographic key material. It would not 
otherwise be possible for third countries to 
have access to the VLF channels without 
Australian knowledge because they would 
have to use the Australian channel. I leave it 
to the House to consider to what countries the 
United States might pass its cryptographic 
key material, given that this would enable the 
other country to read all US traffic on that 
channel.
The statement that, in the circumstances I 
have described, the North West Cape station 
could become a naval command post in some 
conflict between third countries is another 
absurd fabrication. It also ignores the
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e le m e n ta ry  fact th a t  the  N o r th  W est C a p e  
s t a t io n  is s im ply  a  re lay  s t a t io n .  It d o e s  n o t  
o r ig in a te  m essages  a n d  c o u ld  n o t  ac t  as  a 
c o m m a n d  post.
1 tu rn  n o w  f ro m  these  p e r ip h e ra l  issues to  
th e  cen tra l  th e m e  o f  m y h o n o u r a b l e  f r ie n d ’s 
s t a tem en t .  T h is  w as a d e m a n d  fo r  new  a n d  
m o re  ex ten s iv e  A u s t r a l ia n  c o n t r o l  o ve r  the  
t r a n sm is s io n s  o f  the  N o r th  W est  C a p e  s ta t io n  
b ecau se  o f  a ‘d r a m a t i c  ch a n g e  ta k in g  p lace  in 
n u c le a r  d o c t r in e ’. T h e  h o n o u r a b l e  m e m b e r ’s 
d e sc r ip t io n  o f  t r e n d s  in U n ited  S ta te s  
s t ra teg ic  c a p a b i l i ty  a n d  d o c t r in e  c o n ta in e d  
w h a t  I w o u ld  d escr ibe  as so m e  r a th e r  
e le m e n ta ry  m isco n c ep t io n s .  In  essence, he 
said  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  is m o v in g  f r o m  a 
d o c t r in e  o f  m u tu a l ly  a ssu re d  d e s t ru c t io n  to  
th e  use o f  n u c lea r  w e a p o n s  as  a  n o r m a l  p a r t  o f  
th e  c o n d u c t  o f  a w ar.  He even  sp eak s  o f  the  
U nited  S ta te s  m o v in g  to w a rd s  a  f i rs t -s tr ike  
cap ab i l i ty ,  th a t  is, a  p re -e m p t iv e  s t r ik e  th a t  
effectively d es t ro y s  a n  o p p o n e n t ’s ab i l i ty  to  
s tr ike  back.
In S ov ie t  m il i ta ry  d o c tr in e ,  th e  d is t in c t io n  
b e tw een  the  use o f  c o n v e n t io n a l  a n d  n u c le a r  
w e a p o n s  in w a r  is unc lea r .  F o r  decad es ,  
th e re fo re ,  U n ited  S ta te s  po licy  has  been 
c o n c e rn e d  to  e s tab lish  d e te r re n c e  a c ro ss  the  
w ho le  sp e c t ru m  o f  poss ib le  n u c le a r  assau lt .  
T h e  U nited  S ta te s  c a n n o t  c red ib ly  d e te r  
lim i ted  a n d  selective a t t a c k  ag a in s t  U nited  
S ta te s  m il i ta ry  ta rge ts  by th r e a te n in g  to  wipe 
o u t  S ov ie t  cit ies -  especia lly  w hen  the 
re sp o n se  m ig h t  th en  be to  w ipe  o u t  U nited  
S ta te s  cit ies. T h e  S ov ie t  U n io n  has  been 
m a k in g  im m e n se  a l lo c a t io n s  o f  resou rces  to  
the  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  la rger,  m o r e  a c c u ra te  an d  
h a r d e r - h i t t i n g  i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l  b a l l i s t i c  
missile fo rces  —  a h igh ly  im p o r t a n t  fac t th a t  
m y  h o n o u ra b le  fr iend  failed even  to  m e n t io n ,  
let a lo n e  assess in his s t a te m e n t  to  the  
N a t io n a l  P ress  C lub .  T h e  U n io n  o f  Sov ie t  
S oc ia l is t  R ep u b lic s  will s h o r t ly  be in a 
p o s i t io n  to  d e s t ro y  the  b u lk  o f  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  in te rc o n t in e n ta l  ball is tic  m issile  fo rce  
w ith  on ly  a  p a r t  o f  its ow n. S h o u ld  the  U n ited  
S ta te s  th en  re s p o n d  w ith  its s u b m a r in e  a n d  
re s idu a l  b o m b e r  fo rce , the  U n io n  o f  Sov ie t  
Soc ia l is t  R ep u b lic s  w o u ld  still hav e  cap ab i l i ty  
fo r  a  fu r th e r  d e v a s ta t in g  str ike . W h a t  U n ited
S ta te s  P re s id e n t  w o u ld  press  th a t  b u t to n  
h av ing  reg a rd  to  th o s e  c i r cu m stan ces?
U nited  S ta te s  s t ra te g y  fo r  d e te r ren ce  m u s t  
d e m o n s t r a t e  to  th e  U n io n  o f  Sov ie t  Soc ia l is t  
R epub lics  t h a t  th e r e  is no  level o f  a t t a c k  th a t  
w o u ld  n o t  resu lt  in a t  leas t a  m a tc h in g  loss by 
the  U n io n  o f  So v ie t  S oc ia l is t  R epub lics .  A lso  
it m u s t  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  even  a f te r  a t t a c k  on  
its in t e r -c o n t in e n ta l  ball is tic  missile fo rce , the  
U nited  S ta te s  w o u ld  still have  th e  c a p ac i ty  to  
tak e  o u t  ta rg e ts  o f  v a lue  — be th ey  m ili ta ry ,  
ind us tr ia l  o r  p o l i t ico -ad m in is t ra t iv e .  T h e  
basic c o n ce p t  o f  en su r in g  th a t  a P re s id en t  has 
a w ide r  r an g e  o f  re s p o n se  th a n  n a t io n a l  
su ic ide  goes b a ck  tw en ty  y e a rs  o r  m o re .  F a r  
fro m  being  a  n ew  a n d  d r a m a t i c  c h an g e ,  as 
my h o n o u ra b l e  fr iend  believes, P res iden tia l  
D irec t ive  N o  59, issued  by P re s id en t  C a r t e r  in 
late 1979, w as m ere ly  th e  la test  in a  long  series 
o f  s t a te m e n ts  o f  th is  d o c tr in e .  D irec t ive  59 
u p d a te d  basic  d o c t r in e  m o re  d irec tly  to  
c u r r e n t  a n d  p ro s p e c t iv e  co n d i t io n s .  F o u r  
i m p o r t a n t  p o in t s  in th e  d o c t r in e  are: It d oes  
no t a im  a t  a  f i rs t -s t r ik e  capab i l i ty ;  it d oes  
p re p a re  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  re sp o n d  to  a 
limited Sov ie t  n u c le a r  a t t a c k  in w ays o th e r  
th a n  a u to m a t i c ,  im m e d ia te  a n d  m ass ive  
re ta l ia t io n ;  it d o e s  n o t ,  ho w ev er ,  a s su m e  th a t  
nu c lea r  w a r  c o u ld  be k e p t  l im ited; bu t  it d oes  
a im  to  a v o id  a u to m a t i c  esca la tion .
W h a t  I have  been  d esc r ib in g  d o es  no t  
a m o u n t  to  a n y  ‘d r a m a t i c  c h a n g e ’ in US 
n u c lea r  d o c tr in e ,  su ch  as  the  h o n o u ra b l e  
m e m b e r  c la im ed  w as  c h a n g in g  the  w ho le  
basis a n d  ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  o u r  c o o p e ra t io n  in 
the  N o r th  W est C a p e  s ta t ion .  T h e  basic 
p r inc ip les  o f  US n u c le a r  s t ra teg y  have  been 
u n c h a n g e d  fo r  deca d e s .  T h e  tech n o lo g ica l  
d ev e lo p m e n ts  th e  h o n o u r a b l e  m e m b e r  sp o k e  
o f  a re  in the  fu tu re ,  a n d  u n ce r ta in .  It is no t  
a c c e p ta b le  to  r ead  in to  th e m  n o w  a 
fu n d a m e n ta l  c h a n g e  in U S n u c lea r  d o c tr ine .  
In a n y  case, the  L e a d e r  o f  th e  O p p o s i t io n  is 
fa lling in to  the  basic  e r r o r  o f  c o n fu s in g  
cap ab i l i ty  w ith  will a n d  in ten t .  I d o  n o t  deny  
for  o n e  m o m e n t  t h a t  A u s t r a l ia n  c o n tro ls  a re  
req u i red  c o n c e rn in g  N o r th  W est C ap e .  W e 
m u s t  a lw ay s  be ab le  to  ju d g e  w h e th e r  the  
o p e ra t io n  o f  the  s t a t io n  risks o u r  secur ity  o r  
a ssoc ia te s  us w ith  polic ies a n d  o p e ra t io n s  
c o n t r a r y  to  o u r  in te res ts .  B u t  th e  w ho le  p o in t
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ol o u r  a r r a n g e m e n t s  is th a t  US s t ra teg ic  
policy is no t  to  be assessed  s im p ly  in te rm s  o f  
tec h n o lo g ica l  c ap a b i l i ty ,  b u t  m o re  essentia l ly  
in te rm s  o f  in ten t .  It is c o m m o n  g r o u n d ,  I 
believe, th a t  n o  c o n t ro l  m e a s u re s  c an  be 
e llec ted  at N o r th  W est C ap e .  It is a  relay 
s t a t io n ,  n o t  a n  o r ig in a t in g  s ta t ion .  M y 
p re d e ces so r  in th is  p o r t fo l io ,  the  h o n o u ra b le  
m e m b e r  fo r  St G e o rg e  (M r  M o r r is o n ) ,  sa id  in 
A u g u s t  1975:
....the practical, realistic and effective 
mode of monitoring and control is 
certainly not a matter of intervention 
in the operations of the station. The 
proper focus of our effort is the United 
States global policy. If we know what 
that is about, we will have an accurate 
understanding of the type of message 
being transmitted through North West 
Cape.
Control of North West Cape
1 a g ree  w ith  every  syllable  in th a t  s ta te m e n t  
m a d e  by m y h o n o u r a b l e  fr iend  so m e  six y ears  
a g o .  T h e  s t a t e m e n t  v e r y  a c c u r a t e l y  
c o m p r e h e n d s  th e  essence ol A u s t r a l i a ’s 
c o n t r o l  o v e r  N o r t h  W e s t  C a p e .  It 
c o m p r e h e n d s  th e  l im i ta t io n s  o n  A u s t r a l ia n  
c o n tro l  in re spec t o f  p rac t ica l  m easu res .  It 
u n d e r s ta n d s  th e  r e q u i re m e n t  fo r  us t o  ju d g e  
the  im p a c t  o f  d ev e lo p in g  IJS polic ies u p o n  
A u s t r a l ia n  in te res ts  a t  an  ear l ie r  stage, a n d  in 
a m o re  s u b s ta n t i a l  way. M y  h o n o u ra b le  
f r iend ,  h o w ev er ,  w a n t s ‘A u s t r a l i a ’s c o n se n t  to  
be m a n d a t o r y  lo r  all  o rd e r s  to  in i tia te  m ili ta ry  
ac t io n  w h ich  f low s f ro m  the  s ta t ion '.  H e a lso  
w a n ts  us to  be ‘G iven  f i rm  a n d  c o n v in c in g  
a ss u ra n c e s  th a t  th e  S ta t io n  will no t be used to  
send o rd e r s  fo r  a l i rs t -s t r ike  nu c lea r  a t t a c k  
n o r  to  in i tia te  a  limited  s t r ik e . ’
T h e se  d e m a n d s  can  be e x p ec ted  to  
a ro u s e  so m e  u n th in k in g  s u p p o r t .  Let us look  
a t  th e m  m o re  closely. W h a t  these  d e m a n d s  
a m o u n t  to  is a n  A u s t r a l ia n  v e to  ov e r  US use 
o f  th e  N o r th  W est  C a p e  s ta t io n .  Is it 
r e a s o n a b le  to  e x p e c t  the  U S  to  c o o p e ra te  in 
such  a  veto? W o u ld  it be  sens ib le  a n d  
a c c e p ta b le  fo r  A u s t r a l ia  to  seek it? M y  an sw er  
to  b o th  q u e s t io n s  is no. T h e  US carr ies  
e n o r m o u s  risks a n d  re sponsib i l i t ies  in the  
g lob a l  re l a t io n sh ip  w ith  its S o v ie t  ad v e rsa ry .  
A u s tra l ia ,  a  U S  ally, re m o te  f r o m  the  cen tra l
th e a t re s  o f  s t ra teg ic  c o n f r o n ta t io n ,  c a n n o t  
rea l is t ica l ly  say to  th e  US: ‘N o w  every  t im e  
y o u  w a n t  to  send  a signal th r o u g h  N o r th  W est 
C a p e  in i t ia t in g  m il i ta ry  a c t io n  y o u  m u s t  fi rst 
secu re  o u r  p e rm is s io n ’. T h e  N A T O  co u n tr ie s  
d o  n o t  have  this  a r r a n g e m e n t .  T h e  fo r m u la  
ap p ly in g  to  U S  in i t ia t io n  o f  m il i ta ry  ac t io n  
f r o m  th e i r  te r r i to ry  is ‘n o t i f i c a t io n  t im e  a n d  
c i r c u m s ta n c e  p e rm i t t i n g ’. Yet they  a re  fa r  
m o re  d irec t ly  ex p o se d  a n d  v u ln e ra b le  t h a n  is 
A u s tra l ia .
L o o k  a t  th e  p ra c t ic a l  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  my 
h o n o u r a b le  f r i e n d ’s d e m a n d .  T h e  U S D efence  
C o m m u n ic a t io n s  S y s tem  is bu il t  o n  a 
n e tw o rk  o f  r e d u n d a n t  capac i ty .  I f  o n e  link 
goes  o u t  o r  be co m e s  less eff ic ient fo r  an y  
re a s o n ,  in c lud in g  en e m y  ac t io n ,  o th e r  links 
a re  a u to m a t ic a l ly  selected  by the  sw itch ing  
e q u ip m e n t .  T h e re  is no  w ay ,  th e re fo re ,  th a t  
we can  select o u r  m essages c o m in g  th r o u g h  
N o r th  W est C a p e .  M essages ,  a n d  p a r t ic u la r ly  
im p o r t a n t  m essages  such  as th o se  in i t ia t in g  a 
m i l i ta ry  ac t io n ,  will t rave l  th r o u g h  m ul t ip le  
c h a n n e ls  a n d  facili ties. T h e  o n ly  su re  w ay  of 
s t o p p in g  a  m essage  t r a n s i t in g  N o r th  W est 
C a p e  w o u ld  be to  s to p  all m essages c o m in g  to  
N o r th  W est C ape .  In effect, we sh o u ld  have  to  
close th e  s ta t io n  d o w n .  H o w  else c o u ld  we be 
sure ,  a lso ,  th a t  o u r  d e m a n d  w as  b e in g  met?
D oes  m y h o n o u ra b l e  fr iend  u n d e r s ta n d  
th a t  if th e  s ta t io n  .closes d o w n ,  o u r  o w n  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  will severely  suffer,  a n d  a t  a 
t im e  w h en  fa s t  a n d  re l iab le  c o m m u n ic a t io n  
w o u ld  p ro b a b ly  be o f  first im p o r t a n c e  to  us? 
H a s  m y h o n o u ra b le  fr iend  p a u se d  to  reflect 
o n  h o w  he w o u ld  d ea l  w ith  som e  poss ib le  
co n se q u e n c e s  o f  the  d e m a n d  he w ishes to  
m a k e  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  —  fo r  ex a m p le ,  a 
d e m a n d  f ro m  the  U nited  S ta te s  t h a t  we 
s h o u ld  ex p o se  o u r  o w n  n a t io n a l  tra f f ic  to  its 
m o n i to r in g  a n d  co n sen t ,  o r  a d e n ia l  o f  access 
to  th e  a ll ied  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  n e tw o rk  an d  
c o n s e q u e n t  d is ru p t io n  o f  o u r  d efence  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  b ey o n d  A us tra l ia ?
Trust in the United States
W h e n  we a n d  the  A m e r ic a n s  a g ree d  o n  the  
e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  th e  N o r th  W e s t  C a p e  s t a t io n  
w e ac k n o w le d g e d  a n d  ac c e p te d  the  c o m m o n  
a n d  e n d u r in g  secu r i ty  in te res ts  t h a t  sh ap ed
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our cooperation.
That was some two decades ago. We have 
seen some very large changes in the 
international situation and our own strategic 
circumstances since then. Our present 
perspectives and policies give far more 
emphasis to our independent national 
interests and responsibilities. Yet all parties in 
this House continue to acknowledge the 
fundamental importance to us of our alliance 
with the United States. We accept that the 
alliance still assumes a substantial community 
of interest and a substantial degree of mutual 
trust. The alliance can involve risks to our 
secu r i ty ,  a l th o u g h  I ag ree  w ith  my 
honourable friends that the risk presently 
associated with the joint facilities is not 
significant. The alliance can risk our 
involvement in matters in which we should 
prefer not to be involved.
All these positive and negative factors have 
to be weighed. There is scope — quite 
significant scope — for us to influence our 
ally’s policy. We cannot, however, expect that 
we shall always be able to influence it to the 
extent we believe desirable. We have to make 
a judgment then, and a choice. This is really 
what 1 am  saying to my honourable friend. I 
am saying that he cannot leave his choice to 
the last minute as he seems to envisage. This is 
not sensible, realistic or practicable politics. 
He has to make it earlier. Nor can he, even at 
an early stage before the pressure of a 
developing situation is upon us, say to the 
Americans ‘Give me your assurance now 
about no military use and limited nuclear 
attack and all will be well between us? 
because, for the reasons I have explained, he 
will not get this assurance. So he has to ask 
himself the fundamental question: ‘Has the 
time now come when the disadvantages of the 
alliance outweigh the advantages, when the 
risks of assocation with some policy we 
disapprove of outweigh the benefits of our 
continuing co-operation in security matters?’
I can see the logic of his reasoning about 
knowledge and consent. I respect it. But I do 
not for one moment accept that the time has 
arrived or is in prospect when we need to 
contemplate the closure of N orth  West Cape,
of which he speaks so lightly, and the effective 
reduction of our alliance with the United 
States that this would most certainly entail. I 
believe, and 1 have sought to demonstrate, 
that the argument that has led him now to this 
extreme position is ill-founded and unsound. 
I do not believe that it would be in this 
country’s basic security interests to close 
down the station. Our protection against 
major threats ultimately depends upon the 
efficacy of the United States deterrent.
The honourable member rightly demands 
that Australia not behave as a servile client 
state of the United States. Surely, however, 
that is what his own policy involves; for he 
seeks to retain United States protection while 
reducing United States capacity to provide 
that protection. He seeks to retain United 
States protection while freeing Australia from 
risk and requiring all risks to be borne by our 
protector. This is not the attitude of an 
independent ally prepared to make its 
contribution and to accept its share of the 
risks.
I ask my honourable friend most earnestly 
to think again. I ask him to weigh the rhetoric 
of his fine sentiments — and let him claim no 
monopoly of nationalist sentiment — against 
the substantial national interests involved in 
the ANZUS alliance. 1 ask him to let the 
House know, to let the nation know, whether 
he believes that the time has now come in 
respect of North West Cape station for the 
alliance to be reduced and our practical co­
operation with the Americans dismantled. 
T h e re  is n o  a m b ig u i ty  a b o u t  th e  
Government’s attitude. We believe the United 
States carries an enormous burden on behalf 
of the free nations. We believe that through 
the ANZUS alliance we can continue to help 
in the discharge of that burden. This is 
precisely what we propose to do.
Mr. W. Hayden, Leader of the 
Opposition
Quite recently the Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition (M r Lionel Bowen) and I visited 
several joint facilities in this country — 
Nurrungar, Pine Gap, North West Cape and 
Smithfield. Clearly this was the most
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intensive investigation ever undertaken by 
representatives at least of the Opposition — 
probably it was equal in intensity to any 
investigation undertaken by any members of 
this Parliament — into the functions, 
purposes and implications of these centres. At 
a Press conference at Smithfield 1 said that it 
was my hope that the product of our visit 
would be an informed and persistent 
discussion and debate in Australia in relation 
to American nuclear strategic policy and its 
implications. 1 pointed out that Australia is 
very much involved in the implications of that 
sort of policy as a consequence of a number of 
factors, the most dominant of which is the 
operations of these bases.
I have expressed my views in relation to 
three bases — Smithfield, Nurrungar and 
Pine Gap. They have been stated again clearly 
and correctly by the Minister for Defence (M r 
Killen). I have expressed also my reservations 
about the lack of control, the lack of 
knowledge, and the absence of procedures for 
Australia’s consent in relation to the way in 
which the North West Cape base operates. 
Nothing that the Minister said today in any 
way diminishes that concern. Everything he 
has said reinforces the justification for the 
worries which we — that is, my colleague, the 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition and I — 
have expressed in relation to the centre. 
Today’s statement does not contribute to the 
informed debate which 1 had hoped would get 
underway following our visit and the 
statements which we made.
Control of North West Cape
1 wish now to declare the attitude of the 
Australian Labor Party on this matter. The 
inescapable fact remains that Australia has a 
sovereign right to be in ultimate control of 
affairs on her own territory. In these 
circumstances we find present arrangements 
covering the North West Cape unsatisfactory. 
We would seek to renegotiate the North West 
Cape agreement to provide, firstly, that 
Australia’s consent is mandatory for all 
orders to initiate military action which flow 
from the station; and, secondly, that we be 
given firm and convincing assurances that the 
station will not be used to send orders for a
first-strike nuclear attack or to initiate a 
limited strike. If the United States would not 
accept these reasonable provisions designed 
to protect our national sovereignty then we 
would ask it to wind down the operations of 
the North West Cape as rapidly as possible. I 
make no apologies for that declaration of 
principle and policy.
The North West Cape facility operates 
under circumstances dramatically different 
from those which applied less than a decade 
ago. Military equipment, hardware — 
especially strategic nuclear equipment — 
command control and communications 
systems and early warning systems are all 
profoundly more effective and efficient than 
they were several years ago. We have reached 
a point where we are moving into a new 
generation of nuclear armaments with greater 
accuracy and a capacity to take out hard 
targets such as reinforced concrete silos 
containing inter-continental ballistic missiles. 
We are seeing America’s nuclear capacity 
moving more towards a first-strike force. 
That, in turn, will contribute to  a degree of 
instability in super-power relationships. I do 
not deny for a minute that at the same time 
R u ss ia  is ru sh in g  h e a d lo n g  to w a rd s  
im p ro v in g  her  nuc lea r  c a p a c i ty  and  
effectiveness.
But the fact remains that the North West 
Cape communication facility operates in 
circumstances of greatly enhanced military 
and nuclear capacities. At a time when we are 
moving towards a new generation of nuclear 
missiles with a first-strike capacity. It is 
operating in different circumstances. We are 
moving towards a point where the deterrent 
role of the United States nuclear force is 
about to be superseded apparently by a first- 
strike capacity. In those circumstances we 
have a profound obligation to ensure that the 
operations of the North West Cape facility or 
any other facility under our control, that they 
proceed with our consent and so that we know 
what is happening. Should we wish for certain 
things not to happen we should be able to 
regulate such operations. To argue for 
anything less than that is to surrender in the 
most craven way the sovereignty of this
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country. That we will not accept.
I point out another factor. The North West 
Cape facility could be used also for more 
conventional engagements should that be the 
wish of the United States. There could be 
circumstances in which America might 
conclude that its interest was such that it 
should undertake certain things, for instance 
conventional engagements. It could do so in 
an area where we had a major self-interest 
which was somewhat different from that of 
the United States of America. In those 
circumstances we do not want the course of 
development of our foreign policy pre­
empted and then determined by actions 
initiated by the United States of America, as 
powerful and as important an ally as she 
undoubtedly is to us. There can be no quibble 
on the part of members of the Government 
that they share this view when it suits them. 
They were the people, after all, who professed 
much commitment to the Americans at the 
time of the most regrettable incarceration of 
diplomats in Iran. But they were much less 
than enthusiastic in the support they gave to 
t r a d e  em b arg o es .  T h a t  s u p p o r t  fell 
considerably short of what the United States 
sought. Self-interest for Australia determined 
a different level of response from that which 
the Americans believed was appropriate in 
terms of its sovereignty.
Naval exercises
Secondly, we recall a public announcement 
in the course of the last election that, after the 
election, there would be major naval exercises 
involving units of the United States and 
Australian fleets in the north-west Indian 
Ocean. In the upshot, once the election was 
safely out of the way, the Australian units 
exercised separately and quite distantly from 
the American units. The reason was that the 
Australian Government had concluded that it 
was not in our best interest to be seen so 
closely involved in those sorts of exercises 
with America, given the volatility of 
conditions in the Middle East and the 
possibility of certain difficulties arising for 
Australia in terms of both foreign relations 
and trade relations. What we are proposing in
principle is no different from the policy the 
Government pursues when it suits it. We are 
concerned that messages can be transmitted 
through this facility without any knowledge 
by the Australian Government and in 
circumstances which would determine a 
course of events over which we would have no 
control, either nuclear conflict or more 
conventional conflict.
Sinai
1 give another illustration of why there is a 
need for Australia to be alert to this matter, to 
take a very keen interest in the role and 
implications of this facility and to ensure that 
our best interests are at all times preserved. It 
is unfortunate that these things receive such 
scant attention in this House. When they do 
they are usually the victims of frenetic 
propagandising to the effect that ‘The 
Russians are coming’ from members of the 
Government, especially the most obsessive 
and manic member. It does not contribute to 
a b e t te r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  a b o u t  m a jo r  
developments in the world in which we are 
directly implicated. It is equally unfortunate 
that the media finds little interest in this 
matter. It is proposed that America should 
establish a peacekeeping force in the Middle 
East. I refer to an article in the Washington 
Post which was reproduced in the Guardian 
Weekly of 29 March this year. It was headed 
‘Smuggling US Forces Into Mideast’. It 
stated:
The problem is how to establish an 
American ‘strategic presence’ on the 
ground in a way tha t would deter — or 
conceivably defend against — Soviet 
penetrations without embarrassing the 
host nation a n d /o r  unnerving the 
neighbourhood.
The solution: Smuggle it in, so to say, 
in the guise of a peace-keeping force 
to supervise compliance with the terms 
of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
I put to one side my very genuine concern 
that it has been consistently proposed by 
America that Australia should provide 
military support to such a deployment. That 
is a matter for another occasion. I suggest, so 
that we can clarify the issue, that it is most
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unlikely that there would be a direct Russian 
military penetration into the Middle East for 
a number of reasons which have been 
extensively canvassed publicly by intelligent, 
informed, concerned analysts — people who 
support the West. What is more likely is some 
sort of Middle East conflict involving Arab 
states a n d , perhaps, Israel. But again, here is a 
classic instance of when, should this project 
go ahead, messages could be communicated 
through the North West Cape facility w ithout 
any awareness on the part of Australian 
authorities with extraordinary implications 
for this country which we would want to 
resist. Therefore, I put the argument that our 
concern is entirely justifiable and consistent 
with protecting the national interest and 
preserving our sovereignty.
We recall what happened in 1973. The 
North West Cape facility, with other facilities 
in the world, was put on a red alert at the time 
of military engagement between the Israelis 
and the Egyptians. We knew nothing about it 
until it was over. The Minister, in his 
statement, argued that it is wrong of me to 
suggest that there has been change in nuclear 
doctrine in recent times. On page 12 of the 
statement which was distributed to members 
of the House, as distinct from the way in 
which it will appear in the Hansard, he stated:
The basic principles of US nuclear 
strategy have been unchanged for 
decades.
He also said:
Presidential Directive No 59, issued by 
President Carter in late 1979, was merely 
the latest in a long series of statements 
of this doctrine.
That is palpable nonsense. There has been 
a succession of changes over the decades in 
the conceptualisation and projection of 
American nuclear strategic doctrine. To the 
1960s the John  Foster Dulles doctrine was 
massive retaliation. He said that the war 
would be all over in a few days. In the 1960s 
McNamara evolved a policy of mutual 
assured destruction. Nixon advocated a 
policy of flexible response and escalation 
control. President Carter issued presidential 
directive No 59 which, incidentally, is secret
and is not known in all its detail to the 
Government. All the Government knows is 
what other honourable members and 1 know 
from informed reading from public sources in 
the community. The presidential directive 
conceives that a protracted nuclear war could 
be selective and controlled. 1 refer to what 
Defense Secretary Brown said on this matter 
in his Fiscal Year 1982 Annual Report. He 
said:
In addition to providing the ability 
to devastate the full target system of 
the Soviet Union, the countervailing 
strategy gives the President a wide range 
of options, including more selective, 
lesser retaliatory a ttacks.....
I he Minister said that was nonsense, and 
that there is no such things as controlled, 
restricted or limited nuclear war. He said that 
there would be inevitable escalation. 1 suspect 
that he is right but there is a schizophrenia if 
he is right and the President of the United 
States is saying something to the contrary. 
The point 1 am making is that in the 
succession of American Executives there have 
been changes in nuclear doctrine on the part 
of the United States of America.
(Note: Mr Killen interrupted Mr Hayden to 
make the point that Mr Killen agreed with 
this. Mr Brown did say that he doubted very 
much indeed that there could be such a thing 
as a limited nuclear war. Mr Hayden then 
continued.)
The point must also be taken on board that 
Harold Brown returned to that point of view, 
which was one he expressed before he became 
Secretary of Defence, only in his final 
statement when the game was up and he knew 
he was on the way out. The American 
Executive believed otherwise. There is no 
indication of any changes. 1 am making the 
point that there has been a succession of 
changes in American doctrine of substantial 
order. The Minister admitted that there is a 
need for control. On page 13 of the statement 
he said:
I do not deny for one moment that 
A u s t r a l i a n  c o n t r o ls  a re  r e q u i re d  
concerning North West Cape 
But the whole point of our arrange­
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ments is that US strategic policy is 
not to be assessed simply in terms 
of technological capability but more 
e s s e n t i a l l y  in te r m s  o f  in t e n t .
He ag rees  th a t  th e re  sh o u ld  be c o n t r o l  bu t  
th e n  says th a t  it is a  m a t te r  n o t  o f  c a p a b i l i ty  
bu t  o f  in ten t .  1'he G o v e r n m e n t  d o es  n o t  
believe th a t  the  A m e r ic a n s  h av e  th is  in ten t .  1 
d o  n o t  believe th a t  th e y  have  e i ther .  1 believe 
th ey  w ou ld  h o n es t ly  a ssu re  us th a t  they  d o  
n o t .  But the  h is to ry  o f  m a n k i n d  is l i t te red  
w ith  th e  d is tre s s  a n d  v ic iss i tude  o f  co u n tr ie s  
th a t  m a d e  th e  m is tak e  o f  be liev ing  th a t  
a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y ’s g o o d  in te n t  w o u ld  a lw ays  
be th e re  to  p reserve  th e m  f ro m  d if f icu l t ies  o f  
so m e  fo rm  o r  a n o th e r .  1 r e p e a t  t h a t  A m er ic a  
in 1973 p u t  N o r th  W est C a p e  o n  red a le r t  a n d  
did  n o t  adv ise  us. A t the  t im e  o f  th e  a b o r t iv e  
exerc ise  a im e d  at rescu ing  th e  im p r i so n e d  
d ip lo m a t s  A m e r ic a n  w ent in to  Iran  t h r o u g h  
O m a n  a i r p o r t  w i th o u t  th e  a u th o r i t y  o f  th e  
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  O m a n .  T h is  c rea ted  g re a t  
d if f icu l t ies  in th e  re la t io n s  o f  th e  O m a n
G o v e r n m e n t  w ith  its n e ig h b o u rs .  O f  cou rse ,  
we need c o n t ro l .  W e need effective co n t ro l .  
But it is w ro n g  o f  the  M in is te r  to  sugges t ,  a s  
he d o es  on  p ag e  17 o f  his s t a te m e n t ,  t h a t  we 
a re  o p p o s e d  to  the  m il i ta ry  use o f  these  bases. 
I hey a re  m i l i ta ry  bases.  W e are  say ing  th a t  we 
have a  r igh t to  k n o w ,  we need to  k n o w  w h a t  is 
h ap p e n in g .  T h e re  needs  to  be k n o w le d g e  o f  
w h a t  is t a k in g  p lace  a n d  th e re  needs to  be 
con sen t .
US-Soviet Military Strengths
1 j u m p  back  to  p ag e  1 1 o f  the  s t a te m e n t  
w here  the  M in is te r  im plies  th a t  the  U n io n  o f  
S o v i e t  S o c i a l i s t  R e p u b l i c s  m a y  b e  
o v e rh a u l in g  th e  U nited  S ta te s  in te rm s  o f  
s t ra teg ic  cap b i l i ty  a n d  th a t  by im p lica t ion  we 
have  a g re a t  o b l ig a t io n  to  be p e rh a p s  less 
q u e s t io n in g  in th is  m a t te r  m o re  c o m p l ia n t ,  
as  it were.
(M r Hayden then presented the following
tab le  p re p a re d  by the  D efen ce  D e p a r tm e n t  on  
the  re la tive  s t r e n g th s  ol the  tw o  m a jo r  n u c le a r  
power.)
_______________________  S T K A T fr.G K  B A I.A jN C L  ! /■•>; ,« ( 2
Predicted levels for 1985
Present levels W ith SA L T II W ithout SALT II
SA L T II limits_________________________________________________US USSR US USSR US USSR
M IR V ’ed IC B M ’s 820 ..........................................................  550 820 495 820 790 1400
M IR V ’ed SLBM ’s 1,200 ....................................................  520 200 690 380 700 470
1.070 1,020 1,185 1,200 1,400 1,870 
Bombers w ith A C L M ’s 1,320 .........................................  . .  . .  1 3 5  200
1.070 1,020 1,320 1,200 1,600 1,870 
Landbased
Missiles w ith single w arhead o r M R  V’s ICBM  2,250 500 580 500 420 350
Seabased
Missiles w ith single w arhead o r M R V’s SLBM  2,250 . .  760 . .  540 710
Bombers w ithout cruise missiles .........................................  350 150 210 100 145 150
Total operational delivery v e h i c l e s .......................  1,900 2,500 2,030 2,250 2,090 2 730
Total w arhead num bers .........................................  9,200 8,000 11,700 9,000 13^800 12^000
Note: T he figures for delivery vehicles ( ‘Present Levels’ and ‘W ith SA LT II’) are m uch m ore accurate than those for total 
w arhead num bers and the W ithout SA L T  I I ’ colum ns which depend on a large range o f assum ptions.
It (the table - editors) shows very simply Matters of precision, of greater impact,
that the arms capabilities of the two powers is accuracy and so on have to be taken into the
about equivalent. America has about 9,000 calculations. But the countries seem to be
warheads and Russia has about 8000 about equivalent. I observe for the record a
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matter that ought to be pursued in this House 
with more vigour than we have the 
opportunity to do, namely, the overwhelming 
case for pursuing SALT II — the strategic 
arms limitation talks — detente, world 
disarmament, peace — things that do not 
belong to starry-eyed idealists but things of 
concern to people genuinely worried about 
the future of mankind. This table shows that 
with SALT II the number of warheads 
available to the United States will go up to 
nearly 12,000, to Russia to about 9,000 but 
that without SALT II the number will go up 
to nearly 14,000 for the United States and up 
to 12,000 for Russia. That is a mad escalation 
to self-destruction. We have an obligation to 
ensure that to the extent that we make a 
contribution in terms of the nuclear 
deployment between the super-powers, it is a 
contribution towards deterrence, not one that 
in any way at all might facilitate a first strike. 
That is what we are constantly talking about. 
Harold Brown in the statement I quoted from
-  I acknowledge that the Minister arranged 
for me to receive this — said of the effects of 
any nuclear exchange between the super 
powers:
For massive nuclear exchanges involving 
military and economic targets in the 
United States and the Soviet Union, 
fatality estimates range from a low of 
20-55 million up to a high of 155-160 
million in the United States, and from 
a low of 23-24 million up to a high of 
64-100 million in the Soviet Union.
That is massive slaughter of mankind. In 
those circumstances we have no compunction 
at all about declaring our determination to do 
everything we can to regulate the nuclear race 
between the super-powers to ensure that to 
the extent that it exists it is a mutual deterrent 
role and beyond that to work for eventual 
nuclear disarmament.
The other matter that the Minister invites 
me to take up is that of ANZUS. There is 
some implication in what he says that there is 
perhaps a doubt about the strength of our 
commitment to the alliance, perhaps even 
nascently a betrayal of the American alliance, 
of ANZUS by these sorts of questions. The 
Curtin Labor Government 40 years ago
established the Australian-American alliance. 
On that occasion Curtin was condemned by 
the conservatives for betraying Great Britain. 
The criticism never ceases. 1 want to say only 
one thing on that matter. It is my concluding 
point. I invite the Minister and his colleagues 
to respond. The Minister sees great 
difficulties with what I am proposing. He 
believes what I am proposing is impractical 
and unreasonable. Overriding all that the 
Minister states quite categorically that the 
proposal is a threat to the effectiveness of the 
ANZUS alliance. Does he know what the two 
most senior people in the American Embassy, 
apart from the Ambassador who is yet to 
arrive, have declared to me, to members of my 
staff and to at least one of my colleagues that 
they find no problems with what we are 
proposing. They understand completely our 
concern about national sovereignty. They 
believe they can work with the proposal. We 
are up to date with what the ANZUS alliance 
means. We are not prepared to be servile. We 
do not see it as a master-servant relationship 
but one of equals. We are determined to make 
it work but it will work in circumstances 
where there will be areas of disagreement. 
That is clear.
The final point that I want to make on the 
strength of the ANZUS alliance comes from 
Admiral Synnot who said yesterday:
...the ANZUS defence treaty with the United 
States did not guarantee security.
He continued:
...... the US would help Australia if it were under
fundamental threat—
Whatever that is—
but he told a Commonwealth Club luncheon in 
Adelaide there could be many other occasions 
when Australia might have to deal with lesser 
though very demanding threats on its own.
That seems to me to be a sensible 
assessment of what it is all about. That is what 
we are about — national self-respect, a 
determination to preserve our soveignty to 
work, in spite of all the differences which are 
going to arise from time to time, in a self- 
respecting way, not a servile or demeaning 
way, with our major ally.
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MeXtCO'S COMMUNISTS
In the midst of the unfolding Central 
American and Carribean liberation struggles 
stands Mexico, an oil-rich country. Its anti­
imperialist foreign policy combined with 
sharp repression at home is just one of the 
many paradoxes of the Mexican scene.
Mexico is also a country where the recently 
legalised Communist Party (PCM ) is in the 
midst of a ferment of ideas and activity as it 
seeks to define its role in the I980’s. Recently 
this redefinition has included a dramatic 
dialogue with other political groups.
Two Australians, Barry Carr and Barbara 
Marsh, recently spent six months in 
Mexico studying the Mexican Communist 
Party. The author of several books in Spanish 
on the Mexican workers’ movement and 
currently writing a history of the PCM, Barry 
Carr attended the 19th Congress of the PCM 
in March 1981 as an observer. Barbara 
Marsh and Barry Carr were interviewed for 
Australian Left Review by Philip Herington.
There have been some pretty dramatic 
events on the Mexican left in the past few 
months?
Well, the unbelievable seems almost about 
to happen; it looks as though most of the 
parties of the left for once are going to unite to 
form a single party. In the middle of August 
the four parties that form the Coalition of the 
Left, namely the PCM, the PPM , PSR and 
MAUS* agreed to merge with the biggest 
party outside the Coalition, the Mexican 
W orkers’ Party, (PMT). The exact details of 
this merger are not clear yet
Although there has been talk of forming a 
loose united party for the left in previous
*P M T  (Mexican Workers Party); P P M  (Party of 
the Mexican People); P S R  (Revolutionary 
Socialist Party); M A US (breakaway from PCM).
years there was nothing in the deliberations of 
the 19th Congress of the PCM, or for that 
matter in the life of the Mexican left as a 
whole earlier this year, that signalled how 
close such a dramatic event was.
What was the significance of the 19th 
Congress?
The 19th Congress is symptomatic of the 
tremendous changes which have occurred in 
the PCM since, at the 13th Congress in 1960, 
it turned its back on twenty years of crisisand 
disintegration. The 13th Congress took place 
when the party was underground and when 
the workers’ movement as a whole was 
suffering tremendous repression. In 1958-9 
there had been a wave of strike activity 
involving railway workers and telegraphists 
and the party was involved in some of these 
actions. In those days the party was so small 
that the 13th Congress took place in a private 
house in the southern suburbs of Mexico City 
without the public interest that surrounded 
the 19th Congress.
The 13th Congress was held in a former 
brothel which was one of the few houses that 
the PCM could rent for the Congress. Old 
timers recall the alarm caused by furious 
knocking on the door during the Congress 
proceedings. What could very easily have 
been a foretaste of a police raid turned out to 
be some clients of the brothel who hadn’t 
realised that the premises were being put to a 
different use.
Contrast this scene with the 19th Congress
STOP PRESS: A special Congress o f the 
Mexican Communist Party was held in 
October to discuss a new political formation. 
As a result, the MCP dissolved and formed, 
with other political groupings, the united Left 
Party.
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which was held in the congress centre of a 
luxury hotel, the Hotel de Mexico, in the full 
glare of publicity, with observers from many 
areas outside the PCM able to attend virtually 
every session. This was a Congress with 290 
voting delegates (plus hundreds more without 
a vote) representing some 15,000 members. 
The Congress debate was incredibly frank 
and lively with relatively few signs of that 
tradition of communist congresses where the 
issues are decided in advance by the 
leadership and where the Congress itself is 
relegated to a largely ritual role.
A n y o n e  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  M e x i c a n  
communism in the 1940s or ’50s and '60s 
would be amazed at the C P M ’s current 
relationship with Mexican society as a whole. 
The party has a qualitatively greater presence 
in civil society. At certain times, if you turn on 
your radio or TV set, you are able to tune in to 
the party’s programmes. They are jammed in 
between the sentimental soap operas and 
ranch-style music that fill the programming 
most of the time.
In the Chamber of Deputies, not a body 
with much political power in Mexico to be 
sure, there is an eighteen-member Coalition 
of the Left of which half the deputies are 
members of the PCM. The party was able to 
win three-quarters of a million votes in the 
national elections of 1979. So today you have 
a party which has inserted itself deeply into 
Mexican life and one which has also 
u n d e r g o n e  a v e ry  m a j o r  i n t e r n a l  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ,  a rea l p ro c e s s  of  
democratisation at a number of levels.
Until the mid-1960s the PCM was one of 
Latin America’s most stalinised parties. Not 
only did it have an uncritical relationship with 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but 
its internal s truc tu re  was excessively 
centralised. Not even the Central Committee 
could exercise a decision-making role 
effectively. It was a party with a tiny 
membership of a few hundred, largely 
isolated from the working class and peasantry 
and with an unhealthy reputation for 
subservience to the state and to the ruling 
party in Mexico, the PR1. Its legality was 
always unclear and the party went through a
long period of electoral abstentionism, 
arguing that the widespread political 
corruption and all encompassing power of the 
ruling party made electioneering pointless.
The PCM  had suffered an incredible 
amount of political repression, which partly 
explains its relatively marginal status in the 
1950s and early 60s.
It used to have a very narrow vanguardist 
conception of its role and was never able to 
transform itself into a mass party. It also saw 
itself as the sole interpreter of marxist theory 
and practice in the country which obviously 
had a bad effect on its relationship with other 
sectors and parties of the left.
Yet in the last ten years the party has grown 
considerably and changed in the process.
What are the consequences of this change?
First, the party's attitude to other groups 
on the left has changed dramatically. The 
PC M no longer sees itself having a monopoly 
of marxism; it’s simply one of a number of 
focuses of socialist action. This isn’t just a 
change of style, but it’s flowed through to the 
party’s practice, its strategy of alliances and so 
on. Of course, most recently this has led to the 
proposal to form a single party of the left. It 
has also led to short-term agreements with the 
major trotskyist party, the PRT, although the 
current moves to consolidate the Mexican left 
d o n ’t seem to be receiving much support from 
this group. Still, in a country where 
Trotskyism has been so bitterly denounced 
(the PCM explicitly recognised its role in the 
persecution and murder of Trotsky in a book 
published by one of its great leaders, Valentin 
Campa, a few years ago), this is quite an 
achievement.
What sort of presence does the party have 
outside of elections?
Despite the major role the PCM played in 
worker and peasant organisation in the 1920s 
and 1930s, today the party’s presence in the 
mass movement is rather weak. In the 1960s 
the party began to insert itself into university 
unionism. This is rather different from 
Australia. In Mexico, the university trade 
unions include academic, manual and
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administrative workers. Outside of the 
university unions, the party has scattered 
pockets of support in mining centres, metal- 
producing works and in the railway system 
and among school teachers.
But the party’s influence has grown mainly 
among the intelligentsia, professionals, 
students and so on. This has given rise to quite 
a lively debate within the party over the last 
couple of years over whether the party is in 
crisis or not as a result of its changing 
sociological composition, There is talk of a 
‘crisis of growth’ following the party’s 
legalisation in 1976 and ’77. A movement of 
‘r e n o v a to r s ’, q u e s t io n in g  the p a r t y ’s 
strategies, developed, at first in the Central 
Committee and then at lower levels within the 
party. The debate became public for the first 
time in November last year (1980) with the 
publication of a letter in a leading Mexico 
City newspaper signed by thirteen members 
of the Central Committee. The letter was 
titled ‘For the renovation of the Mexican 
Communist Party’.
Could you say something about the 
Congress; how it was organised; the main 
issues?
Well the first thing 1 should say is that there 
were no boring ritual discussions and no 
opportunities to fall asleep. The level of the 
debate was of a very high quality and 
everything was up for discussion. There were 
four committees to discuss the party’s 
s ta tu te s ,  p ro g ra m m e ,  theses  and  the 
secretary-general’s report. The last two days 
were dominated by the plenary sessions which 
met to discuss the conclusions reached by 
each of the four committees. 1 suppose the 
main theme of the Congress was an 
unintended one — a struggle between 
different perspectives on the party’s future. 
Involved in this struggle were issues such as 
the legality of currents of opinion within the 
party, the scope of the Central Committee’s 
prerogatives as well as more general issues 
such as the party’s position on the question of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat.
What were the issues raised by the 
‘renovators group?
First, its important not to see them as 
forming a homogeneous grouping; there are 
differences arming them on many issues. 
Broadly, though, they are critical of what 
they regard as the party’s uncritical embrace 
of parliamentarism which has led the party to 
divert resources from mass work. A second 
theme in the renovators’platform is a call for 
greater democratisation in the party’s 
practice including a definition of the power of 
the Central Committee and the legalisation of 
horizontal contacts between different organs 
at the base level. Another theme is concern 
over the way in which, according to the 
renovators, the party has become a ‘party of 
opinion’ rather than a mass party. In other 
words that the party has used its legal status to 
influence public opinion, penetrate the daily 
press, etc., rather than involving itself more 
firmly in mass action. The particular criticism 
was linked with the renovators’ concern over 
the party’s very limited involvement with the 
Mexican working class and peasantry at a 
time when the country was going through a 
deep process of proletarianisation.
How did the leadership respond to these 
views?
It went more or less as follows. The 
renovators are said to be a minority of 
intellectuals guilty of a return to the anti- 
parliamentarianism of the party’s past when 
anarcho-syndicalist views were much in 
evidence. The way they are emphasising the 
need for mass struggle, etc., is tantamount to 
the development of a workerist current which 
ignores the increasing importance of middle- 
sector groups, the intelligentsia, state 
employees, radicalised petty bourgeoisie, etc. 
Lastly the manner in which the renovators put 
forward their position raises legitimate fears 
of the emergence of factions within the party.
How was the debate resolved?
The renovators remained a minority both 
within the new Central Committee and within 
the Cofigress as a whole. However, on many 
issues the renovators were supported by 
delegates who were not identified with the 
overall position of the renovators. This 
meant, for example, that the Congress agreed 
to legalise horizontal contact in the party and
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the Central Committee lost its automatic 
right to vote in the Congresses. In the future, 
assuming that the PCM will still exist as a 
separate party after the ‘merger’ of the parties 
of the left projected for next year, members of 
the Central Committee will have a vote only 
when elected as delegates to the Congress by a 
basic party organisation. On the big issues of 
the day the relationship between the party and 
workers’ and peasants’ movement, the role of 
parliamentary work, the strategy of alliances 
with other groups on the left — nothing was 
really resolved mainly because the inner-party 
struggle diverted attention from these issues.
What 1 think was most important was that 
this dispute was not resolved through 
expulsions and splits as has happened in the 
past. This is a tremendous achievment and so 
is the vigour and depth of debate within the 
PCM.
One remarkable aspect of Mexican society 
is the enormous interest in marxist theory and 
writings. What impact has this had on the 
debate in the PCM, and is there any reflection 
of the much discussed ‘crisis of marxism?
There’s no doubt that the P C M ’s enormous 
growth over the last five years or so has got a 
lot to do with the growth of marxism as a 
whole. Marxism is almost hegemonic among 
the intelligentsia. There are probably more 
marxist magazines printed in Mexico today 
than in any other comparable Third World 
country. The bookshops, even of a 
commercial variety, are chock-a-block with 
marxist literature, old and new. Of course 
since 1973 Mexico has become a refuge for 
thousands of exiled leftists from all over Latin 
America and this influx of talent has 
transformed the universities and public 
debate in the country. However, bourgeois 
ideologies, particularly notions of class 
collaboration and corporatism are still 
influential in the workers’ movement, still 
largely tied to the official party, the PR1, 
through a network of mass organisations 
which d ra s t ic a l ly  c u rb  w o rk ing -c lass  
autonomy.
I suppose the ‘crisis of marxism’is reflected 
in another sense too. The P C M ’s rapid 
growth has meant that the party has had to
assimilate very quickly a large number of 
people with very varying perspectives and 
relationships to marxism. The party’s ability 
to integrate all these people into its basic party 
activity has been limited, and the range of 
perspectives brought into the party is vast, 
contradictory as well as exhilaratingly 
unorthodox. So there’s both great intellectual 
excitement as well as intellectual and 
ideological diversity or what some people 
have called a tremendous intellectual 
‘dispersion’.
Is there a conflict between traditional 
worker-based sections of the party and newer 
intellectually trained members?
So far 1 d o n ’t think that this is the area of 
disputation except possibly on the issue of 
sexual politics. This is an area which is 
relatively new to the life of the PC M  and in 
Mexico as a whole - certainly quite different 
to the situation in Australia.
Is the PCM the Latin American flag-waver 
for Euro-communism (EC) as is sometimes 
suggested?
1 must say I am very sceptical; in fact I 
w ouldn’t agree with that characterisation. 
First, it is very difficult to decide precisely 
what a Euro-communist party is. The 
differences between the Spanish, French and 
Italian parties are enormous. They reflect the 
different political histories of those countries 
and different social structures. I would say 
that the PCM  is not a Euro-communist party 
because EC was an attempt to come to terms 
with the application of marxist political 
practice to advanced capitalist societies. It 
involved the questioning of models which had 
been uncritically assimilated from the 
experience of the Soviet Union and from 
leninist practice of a different era. F or  all its 
burgeoning capitalist economy, Mexico 
cannot be considered a member of the 
advanced capitalist ‘core region’ like France 
or Italy. It i$ not like these other societies for a 
num ber of reasons.
At the same time, if you look at EC as the 
sum of a number of characteristics then you 
certainly can find some of these features 
present in the PCM . For example, the
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relationship between national communist 
parties and the international communist 
movement. There is no question that the 
PCM  shares the Euro-communist position on 
the importance of autonom y and non­
interference of the movement in the affairs of 
the n a t io n a l  p a r t ie s .  T h is  has been 
demonstrated time and time again — 
b eg in n in g  with the  M ex ican  p a r t y ’s 
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and more recently Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan.
There was a very vivid debate at the 19th 
Congress over the appropriateness of the 
concept ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. The 
arguments used in the debate were very 
similar to those used in Western Europe, but 
the resolution of the debate is somewhat 
different. At the 19th Congress the delegates 
very narrowly approved the leadership’s 
decision to eliminate the term from the party’s 
programme and it was replaced with a new 
phrase ‘democratic workers’ power’. In other 
words the essential content of the term was 
retained. The change didn’t have anything to 
do with the strong ‘pluralist’ tradition within 
the Mexican working class because such a 
tradition does not exist. It was dropped 
because of the unfortunate connotations of 
the term ‘dictatorship’ in a country with a very 
authoritarian political system. Since the 
PCM saw its role as being part of the struggle 
against effective one-party authoritarianism 
and fo r  the achievement of autonom y for the 
mass organisations of workers and peasants, 
it was thought that ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ d idn’t emphasise sufficiently the 
democratic character of the state in the 
transition stage.
In terms of internal organisation and 
structure, in terms of democratisation, the 
PCM does feed into a number of the currents 
active in EC. There is a much more authentic 
interpretation of democratic centralism, a 
rejection of vanguardist notions and a 
rethinking of the party’s position towards 
other left parties and groups. The logical 
extension of this last point is the recent 
decision to work for the formation of a new 
united party of the left, even if this means the
abandonment of the party’s separate name 
and existence.
But despite all these similarities with EC 
there is at the same time a profoundly held 
belief, and this cuts across the different 
currents of opinion within the party, that EC 
has limited relevance to Mexican conditions. 
This is not based on any purist prejudice 
about where EC has led some of the European 
parties but is based on an assessment of the 
differences between Mexican society and the 
structure of the advanced capitalist world. It 
is based on the fact that in Mexico the state, 
more obviously so than in Western Europe, 
exercises its authority through the use of 
violence than through a more broadly 
articulated hegemony in civil society.
Therefore some of the conceptions of EC, 
which are the result of a concrete analysis of 
the peculiarities of the state in advanced 
capitalist society, do not apply in the Mexican 
case. It is also based upon a characterisation 
of the nature of the working class and popular 
movements in Mexico. In Europe we have 
working class movements that are very old. 
They go back to the beginnings of the 19th 
century movements that have struggled for 
over a century for the franchise, for 
democratic rights; movements in which the 
more progressive elements of bourgeois 
democracy have taken very strong roots as a 
result of the struggle of popular movements. 
In Mexico this is not the case. The popular 
movements of workers and peasants have 
never been successful in forcing the 
establishment of a regime of liberal 
democracy. On the contrary, as faras Mexico 
is concerned, the parliamentary system is 
sy n o n y m o u s  with c o r ru p t io n ,  ser ious  
violence, manipulation and fraud.
There is no broadly based identification 
with parliamentary democracy. On the 
contrary the major concern of the popular 
movement is with much more basic issues 
such as a struggle for the autonomy of the 
trade unions and peasant associations, a 
struggle for union independence and 
democracy.
The third strand of the relationship of
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Mexico to EC is to  be found in the 
relationship between Mexico and the United 
States. In Mexico we are dealing with a highly 
dependent society, a society which like many 
other Latin American societies experiences 
imperialism in a much more direct and crude 
fashion than the more mature and somewhat 
more autonomous capitalist countries of 
Western Europe. In this context a radical 
break with capitalism in Mexico would 
signify a much more traumatic break with the 
inter-American socio-economic system than 
would be the case in Europe. Or at least, this is 
the assumption. And I think it would 
therefore provoke the kind of intervention by 
the United States that, directly or indirectly. 
Euro-communist strategy is least capable of 
dealing with. In other words, while it would 
be quite wrong to suggest that the PCM 
embraces a strategy of armed struggle — it is 
not a party that sees armed struggle as being 
on the agenda at the moment, far from it, it is 
a party in which people see the break with 
capitalism as involving a degree of violence 
which is qualitatively much greater than we 
could conceive of occurring or being 
n e c e s s a ry  in th e  m a tu r e  c a p i t a l i s t  
democracies of Western Europe. So it is for 
these reasons, that despite certain similarities 
in the programme and in the style of the PCM 
with some sort of model of EC, there are a 
number of elements that would clearly mark 
off the PCM from the Euro-communist 
parties. The leadership quite firmly abstains 
from any characterisation of the .PCM as 
Euro-communist.
How does Mexico and the PCM assess the 
Central American and Carribean liberation 
struggles?
Mexico has for a very long time had a 
foreign policy with a strong anti-imperialist 
flavour, at the level of rhetoric, largely 
speaking. Nevertheless, Mexico has been 
genuinely anti-imperialist and it is easy to  see 
why, given th e  n a tu re  of M e x ic o ’s 
revolutionary movement and the nature of 
continuing relations between Mexico and 
successive United States’ administrations. 
The discovery of new deposits of oil in the last 
four years has given this anti-imperialist
element greater zap. This can be seen in the 
current administration of Jose Lopez 
Portillo, although it is generally regarded as a 
rather conservative government in terms of its 
domestic social and economic policies.
The most notable developments have been 
Mexico’s support for the Sandinista struggle 
a g a in s t  S o m o z a  a n d  th e n  fo r  the  
Reconstruction Government in Nicaragua 
and more recently in support for the F D R  in 
El Salvador. A short while ago the French 
a nd  M ex ican  g o v e rn m e n ts  issued a 
declaration announcing their recognitions of 
the F D R  as a ‘significant political force’ in El 
Salvador. The Mexican government has 
supplied oil and other resources to Nicaragua 
at quite reasonable prices by world standards, 
assisted with the literacy campaign, and in the 
diplomatic sphere it lobbies hard for the 
principle of non-intervention in Central 
American affairs. The ruling party in Mexico, 
the PR I, clearly sees itself as allied to the 
position of the Socialist International on 
most Central American issues.
I think that Mexico and the United States 
are bound to clash more frequently over 
Central America in the next few years. Its not 
only the anti-imperialist content of the 
Mexican revolution th a t ’s at stake either. 
Mexico likes to think of itself as exercising a 
b en ev o len t  p r o te c to ra te  over  C en tra l  
America itself. This ‘special relationship’ of 
Mexico to the region is linked not only to 
history (the region was originally one unit in 
colonial times) but to economic questions — 
to Mexico’s growing investment and trade 
with the region.
The PCM has always had a lively interest 
in, and concern with the countries of Central 
America. In fact the PCM  itself helped create 
virtually all the communist parties of the 
region in the 1920s and 1930s and the party 
played an important role in assisting Sandino 
in Nicaragua during this period. Needless to 
say the party has argued consistently against 
imperialist intervention in the region, 
although its fair to say that there is such 
unanimity on this subject among all the 
nationalist and left sectors in Mexico that the 
party isn’t unique in its position.
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reviews
Marx, Engels and National Movements by
Ian Cumm ins, Croom  Helm, London, 1980. 
205 pp. $44, hardback. Reviewed by  Mike 
Donaldson.
M arx, Engels and  N ational M ovem ents  is a 
collection, joined with commentary, of Marx and 
Engels’ observations on the national question. The 
observations appeared in their lifetime in 
newspaper articles, lectures, letters and as sub- 
topics in major theoretical works.
In their writings of the 1840s, M arx and Engels 
co n s id e re d  th a t  c a p i t a l i sm  a n d  n a t io n a l  
in d e p e n d e n c e  went h a n d  in h a n d  since 
independent national economic development was 
the raison d ’etre of the bourgeoisie. Capitalism was 
intimately linked with the emergence of a national 
capitalist class shaped by and controlling the 
nation state. Further,  Marx and Engels believed 
th a t  capita lism manifested an  objectively 
p ro g re ss iv e  c h a ra c te r ,  it co m p e l le d  no n -  
European lands “to introduce what it calls 
civilisation into their midst, ie to become 
bourgeois themselves. In one word it create(d) a 
world after its own image” (from the M anifesto. 
This view — that the non-European world was 
fated to become essentially like Western Europe 
was coupled with the view that “everything that 
centralises the bourgeoisie is advantageous to the 
workers” (M arx to Engels, July 1866). Bourgeois 
hegemony they thought, would bring unity to 
small and fragmented states, and in the long run, 
this was helpful to the international workers’ 
movement.
Eurocentrism
Engels (in 1849 at least) was even sharper in his 
eurocentrism, talking of “residual fragments of 
peoples (who) always become fanatical standard- 
bearers of counter-revolution and remain so until 
their complete extirpation or the loss of their 
national character”. Such were the Southern Slavs, 
the Czechs, the Moravians, the Slovaks, the Gaels, 
the Basques, the Bretons who were peoples who 
“ n ev er  had  a h i s to r y ” . In d eed ,  E n g e ls ’ 
eurocentrism slipped into racism when he posited
the existence of “entire reactionary peoples”.
Following the revolutions of 1848, Marx and 
Engels reconsidered their att itude to the small and 
semi-feudal nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and to India and China. But the 
reconsideration was based on tactical concerns, 
each national movement being judged progressive 
or reactionary to  the extent tha t  it might weaken — 
or even hasten — the crisis of capitalism in Western 
Europe.
In Capital M arx demonstrated that industrial 
capitalism owed its birth partly to the destruction 
of nations outside of Western Europe. With the 
growth of industrial capitalism the conquered 
territories, initially a source of tribute and raw 
materials, took on addit ional importance as 
markets for manufactures. As the existence of such 
markets helped to  stave off the decline in the rate of 
profit, a crisis within colonial economies, Marx 
argued, could have a substantial dislocating effect 
on capitalism in Europe.
Ire la n d ,  E ng lish  c a p i t a l ’s f irs t co lo n ia l  
acquisition, played a vital role in maintaining the 
stability of the English ruling class. Marx and 
Engels watched events in India and Ireland closely, 
in the hope that political a n d /o r  economic crises 
there would have a destabilising effect on ruling 
class hegemony in England. Their consideration of 
India, Ireland and Poland remained at this level: 
that the freedom of subjugated nations remained 
dependent upon the triumph of the European 
working class, but political and economic events 
within the dominated nations could have a crisis- 
inducing significance in Europe itself.
Events in Poland in 1863 forced Marx and 
Engels to again reconsider their approach. In that 
year the Poles rose against Russian Tsarism and 
were savagely repressed. Elements of the gentry 
headed the nationalist movement but, as a class, 
Polish serfs stood to gain more from the continued 
overlordship of Russia, for territories controlled 
by Russia had carried through the emancipation 
acts ordered by the Tsar in 1860. National interest 
or class interest? — the socialist movement was 
divided. Some argued that what served the 
interests of the most oppressed and exploited class 
most directly and immediately was what mattered. 
In this case the emancipation of the serfs under 
Russian domination was better than Polish self- 
determination coupled with oppression and 
inhumanity at the hands of Polish landlords and 
gentry.
M arx and Engels, on the other hand, argued that 
the cause of national self-determination came first.
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Engels sharply criticised those Polish socialists 
who did “not place the liberation of their country 
at the head of their programme... .ln  order to be 
able to fight one needs first a soil to stand on, air, 
light and space. Otherwise all is idle chatter" 
(Engels to Kautsky, 1882).
In putting this position, Marx and Engels were 
again influenced by strategic and tactical 
questions. Russia was “the great bastion of 
European reaction”; whatever weakened Russia, 
objectively served the interests of the European 
working class movement as a whole.
On reconsidering Poland, M arx and Engels 
thought again of their position on Ireland. Jus t as 
Polish nationalism would weaken Russian 
hegemony, so too would Irish liberation strike at 
the heart of British capitalism. Ireland was 
im portant to Britain not only as a market for 
British investment and manufactured exports; it 
was a source of cheap labour power. Indeed, the 
importation of Irish workers was fostered by 
British capitalists in part to divide and weaken the 
working class. The freedom of Ireland would 
ameliorate this condition, and furthermore it 
would deprive the English government of "the only 
pretext (it had) for retaining a big standing army 
which....(could) be used against the English 
workers after having done its military training in 
Ireland” (M arx, 1870). So important was Ireland 
to the rule of British capital, Marx concluded in 
1870, that the national emancipation of Ireland 
was a precondition for socialism in England. Marx 
and Engels no longer considered that the national 
self-determination of colonial possessions would 
have to await the victory of the European 
p ro le tar ia t ,  indeed, struggles fo r  na tional 
independence might not only trigger revolutionary 
upsurges in Europe, but might be essential to their 
success.
In the last years of his life, M arx continued to 
reappraise his views of the nature of nationalist 
struggle. His most important theoretical work, 
Capital, laid bare the workings of industrial 
capitalism in Western Europe, but did not seek to 
describe the laws of motion of other modes of 
production. A revolutionary upsurge in Russia led 
him to question his view that precapitalist social 
formations need necessarily be transformed, and 
capitalism implanted, before the transition to 
socialism could be effected. Perhaps it was possible 
for socialism to be achieved in places where 
capitalism had not become dominant? As far as 
Russia was concerned, the question was to prove 
academic. By the late nineteenth century the 
capitalist mode was well established — even
transforming social relations in the countryside. 
M a rx ’s encounter with the Russian populists and 
anarchists of the Narodnaya Volya stirred his heart 
and set his mind racing, putting him at odds with 
the pedants among the Russian marxists Even in 
old age he did not fear new knowledge and 
experience.
Cummins is less concise than the above 
summary of Marx and Engels’ views on self- 
determination suggests, and this is one of the 
puzzles of the book which describes at length, and 
with copious quotation, what M arx and Engels 
had to say about national movements. But the 
book stops there. Collections of M arx and Engels 
on India, Ireland, colonialism and the national 
question have existed for some time and are well 
known to marxists with an interest in the third 
world. So it is difficult to see the use of a further 
compilation.
All around Cummins rages a debate within 
marxism on the question of national self- 
determination. Marxists in the debate have long 
since ingested the views of Marx and Engels, and 
indeed the emergence of the Dependency School 
was partly a reaction to the ritualistic adoption by 
some Latin American communist parties of 
Stalin’s rigidification of Marx and Engels’ 
hesitant, unformed views. For Cummins, it is as if 
this debate had never happened. He reminds 
marxists again of the ethnocentrism of M arx and 
Engels, something worth being reminded of, but to 
stop there is less than adequate.
Since Marx and Engels, marxist historians and 
social scientists have made substantial theoretical 
advances in the analysis of non-capitalist modes of 
production and their relationship to Western 
European capitalism. If Cummins should remind 
us of the origins of this growth and development in 
order to contr ibute to it, then one could not 
complain; but to restate the views of the old 
masters, as if nothing had happened since, serves 
little purpose. The restatement of M arx and 
Engels, in a vacuum as it were, is even more curious 
because Cumm ins’ bibliography contains work by 
Kiernan, H.B. Davis and Draper, three whose 
writings in the late nineteen sixties and early 
seventies contr ibuted to the reopening of the whole 
q u e s t i o n  o f  m a r x i s m  a n d  n a t i o n a l i s m .
A reassessment of the contribution of M arx  and 
Engels, in the light of the recent debate, would have 
been timely especially since Geoffrey Kay has 
resurrected M arx’s aphorism that “ industrial 
capitalism creates a world after its own im age”, 
arguing that the problems of the third world result
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not so much from the exploitation of capital but 
from the fact that capital did not exploit them 
enough. Such bold claims bolster the assertion that 
the problems of the agrarian socialisms developed 
in China, Vietnam and Kampuchea are at least 
partly attributable to the stunted and still-born 
capitalism which preceded them. Such is the 
gravity of the debate and the importance of a 
reassessment of the place of Marx and Engels 
within it. Unfortunately, Cummins does not seem 
to be aware that it is even taking place.
The scholarly nature of Cummins work is not at 
issue. Perhaps unfairly I am criticising him for not 
doing what he did not set out to do. At root, the 
difference is between one who sees the work of 
M arx and Engels as a complete and interesting 
object of study, and another who considers 
marxism as alive, growing and, above all, useful — 
the difference between a marxologist and a 
marxist.
Finally, some comment must be made on the 
price of the book. At an outrageous $44, each page 
is priced at more than 21 cents. The whole book 
could be photocopied for less than  $10.
War For the Asking by M ichael Sexton, 
Penguin Australia, 1981. Price$5.95. IS B N 0 -  
14-005909-1. Reviewed by  Toni Stephens.
On April 29th, 1965, Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies announced his G overnm ent’s decision to 
commit Australian combat troops to the war in 
Vietnam. During the following six years, 
thousands of young Australians were sent to fight 
in a  war which seemed to have little relevance for 
Australia. When Australian troops were finally 
withdrawn by the end of 1971, nearly 500 had been 
killed and 2,500 wounded. Countless others still 
suffer from physical and psychological disorders 
attributable to their time in Vietnam.
Why did the Australian Government decide to 
commit Australian forces to Vietnam? Was it 
pressure from our great protector and ally, the 
United States of America? Or was it in response, as 
was publicly announced, to a request from the 
South Vietnamese Government of Prime Minister 
Phan  Huy Quat? These are some of the questions 
addressed by Michael Sexton, Senior Lecturer in 
Law at the University of New South  Wales, in his 
book War fo r  the A sking . With access to much 
relevant correspondence between the United 
States and the Australian Governments, and other 
p r e v i o u s ly  u n p u b l i s h e d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  
par t icu la r ly  te legram s, between A ustra lian  
politicians and diplomats in Washington,
Canberra and Saigon, Sexton has provided us with 
a new account o f  how Australia really came to be 
involved in Vietnam, which account not only 
effectively puts to rest certain myths o f '‘external” 
pressure but also lays the responsibility squarely 
on our own Government.
In December, 1964, the military position in 
Saigon was deteriorating and the Americans were 
faced with a situation of military and political 
chaos. In addition, international pressure was 
brought to bear by such countries as France and 
Britain for the neutralisation of Vietnam. 
Australia, however, alarmed at any sign of 
wavering from the United States “set out to use 
whatever influence it had to push the Americans so 
deeply into the morass that they would have no 
alternative but to press on to the end”. The strategy 
used by Australian politicians, evident from 
communications quoted by Sexton, was “to arouse 
concern in the Americans... .that their position 
appeared vacillating or powerless to the rest of  the 
world”. During January , 1965, the situation in 
Washington remained fluid with no firm decision 
to put ground troops into Vietnam; nor was any 
decision made until late February. However, not 
only did the Australian Government in the three 
months prior to this decision continually press the 
United States to bomb North Vietnam and 
dissuade them from any idea of negotiating with 
Hanoi, it also pushed for the involvement of 
Australian combat troops in Vk mam, despite the 
United States’ request only for instructors.
On 2nd March, 1965, at the direction of 
President Johnson, the bombing of North Vietnam 
commenced. On 5th March, US troops landed at 
Da Nang on the north coast of South Vietnam. At 
this stage still no formal request was made for 
troops from Australia, despite constant pressure 
by the Australian Government for such a formal 
request. In April, 1965, the Menzies’ Government 
finally secured approval from the United States for 
Australian troop involvement and was anxious to 
immediately make the announcement public; 
however, the Australian Government insisted that 
the request be seen to come from Prime Minister 
Quat. According to Sexton, and supported by 
evidence from telegram communications, “the last 
act of this diplomatic d ram a was to contain some 
of its most frenetic scenes”, as the South 
Vietnamese Government had to be “persuaded "of 
the need not only for addit ional American troops 
but also for non-American troops. That the letter 
from Prime Minister Quat made this quite clear 
was further evidenced by the fact that it was only 
finally tabled in Parliament a few months before 
the last Australian troops were withdrawn.
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What were the reasons for Australia’s push for 
involvement in and escalation of the Vietnam War? 
Has the investment of the ruined lives of many 
Australian people, not to mention the Vietnamese, 
paid off dividends for Australia? According to 
Michael Sexton there were two reasons for this 
policy — “both unstated and normally obscured by 
rhetoric about the downward thrust of  Asian 
hordes” — firstly, tha t it would be to Australia’s 
advantage that America be locked into the South 
East Asian region by their involvement in 
Vietnam; and secondly, tha t  by accepting 
assistance from Australia, the United States 
Government would feel obliged to protect 
Australia should it be threatened by any South 
East Asian source. As Sexton points out,  this 
policy has had precisely the opposite effect: “ten 
years after the Australian decision to send troops, 
the Americans had withdrawn from the Asian 
mainland” — with their tail between their legs, and 
with total casualties of 55.000 dead and 300,000 
wounded (this does not include the 55,000 US 
veterans who since returning home from Vietnam 
have committed suicide.)
The decision by the Menzies’ Government was 
taken in a political climate in Australia where the 
Government in such a strong position was able to 
effectively gag any real public debate. It is here, 
according to Sexton, that implications for 
Australia’s foreign policy may be drawn, for as he 
points out this system of decision-making remains 
unaltered. “There is, therefore, a considerable risk 
that decisions as misconceived as that of 1965 will 
be made in the 1980’s with much more 
disastrous consequences”.
War F or The A sk in g  is a compelling book, both 
in its content and its message. Despite the many 
quoted texts it is easy to read with Sexton’s lucid 
style and hard to put down once begun. Hopefully 
many people will read it and notch it up as one 
more contribution to the public debate that must 
become reality if the world is to successfully 
navigate the nuclear waters of the 1980’s.
Winner Take All by D onald Horne, Penguin 
Books,' M elbourne, 1981. 132 pp. $2.95. 
Reviewed by  Roger Coates.
Donald Horne has followed D eath o f  the Lucky  
Country, his 1976 essay on the end of the Whitlam 
Era, with another political “quickie” Winner Take 
All, his avowed aim being to write a short book  on 
the 1980 Federal election and its meaning. In some 
respects, however, H orne’s new book is more 
about “lack of meaning” than “meaning”.,
There are four im portant strands running
through the book: the obfuscatory nature of the 
1980 election campaign; an analysis of where the 
Labor Party is at of now; the government-forming 
process in Australia; and the power of the received 
wisdom or “common sense” in shaping the political 
values and judgement of the electorate. Each of 
these points is well worth discussing.
In a chapter entitled “ Heroes, Villains and 
Fools”, Donald Horne draws attention to how 
election campaigns often fail to come to grips with 
the im portant issues facing the community. For a 
variety of reasons the matters of real substance are 
played down — or even completely ignored. He 
argues tha t the 1980 election campaign was a stark 
example of this over-simplification of complex 
issues.
The central economic issue facing Australia last 
year was the imminent development “b oo m ” and 
its likely consequences — economic, social, 
political. However, there wasn’t, Horne says, real 
debate between the government coalition and 
Labor about these matters of far-reaching 
importance. Nor was there any real attempt to 
explain that large-scale unemployment was due to 
the end of the post-second world war boom; nor to 
explain why “managed” capitalism had failed. 
Money Ethos
The coalition’s lack of interest in a serious 
explanation is obvious enough for Horne not to 
pursue this point; what is more im portant is 
L abor’s failure. Here he suggests that the Labor 
Party  is inhibited by its bi-partisan acceptance of 
the national belief in development and economic 
growth, which he argues lies at the bo ttom  of the 
“ ru l in g  ‘p r a g m a t i s m ’ o f  A u s t r a l i a n s , ”  a 
pragmatism that “sees money as the measure o f  all 
th ings.” Under the impetus of this money ethos, 
enthusiasm for “national development” (in the case 
of Queensland and Western Australia, state 
development) becomes “a passion for development 
pursued not in rational terms of cost and benefit 
but for its ow n sa ke”, as something inherently 
good. What the Labor Party needs to do, 
according to Horne, is to question this philosophy 
on two levels: first, does it make sense; but more 
im portant, to ask who will benefit; who gains, who 
and what loses?
A part from these general considerations, 
development should be effectively taxed and big 
business concessions abandoned; more of the 
public money now spent in helping transnational 
and  national corporations could be spent on 
government prospecting, government mines and 
government processing-plants.
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As well as dealing directly with the development 
boom, Donald Horne deals with the allied 
economic and social costs: the manufacturing 
industry run-down; inflation; cyclical and 
structural unemployment; and loss of Australian 
control of Australian assets and resources. He 
develops an important point which perhaps helps 
to explain the evolution of his ideological position 
since the 1960s.
In the late 1960s the Australian business class 
failed the test of maintaining the national interest. 
It is part of the further development of H orne’s 
“ Lucky C ountry” thesis that Australian business 
derives a sense of self-importance from its old and 
new imperial connections; and an accession of 
foreign money is a measure of national importance 
regardless of the effect of national independence 
Horne w on’t have this. So he now casts Australian 
business as a com prador class prepared to sell out 
completely.
Despite an Australian belief that Australians are 
on the same side as the exploiters of other people’s 
resources, what has been happening to Australia is 
a degree of latin-americanisation. Western 
Australia and Queensland are more than a little 
down the path of becoming banana republics: what 
matters is keeping the foreign companies happy. 
Horne stresses that it is not at all fanciful to point 
out that big transnational mining companies have 
been known to favour secessionist movements (for 
example, Katanga), that at least in the case of the 
United States, political interference by big 
corporations can be linked with overt diplomatic 
activity and covert intelligence activity.
The Labor Party
Donald Horne is decidedly ambivalent about 
the Labor Party. On the one hand, he suggests 1980 
saw the resurrection of Labor; in electoral support,  
if not in seats won, the Labor Party came within 
one percentage point of being preferred by a 
majority of Australian voters. On the other hand, 
he stresses the extraordinary fragility of Labor’s 
apparent relegitimisation and how Labor fears 
policies and actions (for example, the pre-election 
mobilisation), that will put at risk its ability to 
form a “legitimate” government. Is Labor merely 
tolerated on Liberal terms as part of a two-party 
system, or is it a quite independent party with its 
own distinct policies?
Nowhere is this dilemma clearer than in the 
areas of foreign and defence policies. In this 
connection Horne writes of the long debilitation of 
the Labor Party and its timidity in taking an 
independent, Australian stance. Yet, he is timid
himself about Labor repudiating the American 
alliance. The odds are too great. In any case, the 
alliance with the United States is “common sense”, 
even if unpalatable “comm on sense”.
Donald Horne believes that the American 
alliance is based on two related factors: first, 
Australia’s “traditional vassal’s view of the world”; 
and, second, fear of having to fend for itself. 
Through their long-standing association with 
Britain and then America, Australians, although 
subordinate, see themselves as part of the 
dominant group that runs the world. But by 
accepting a separate Australian identity and 
separate interests, they would move outside the 
dominant group and put their national existence at 
risk. All this is “comm on sense”. Hence, the 
American alliance is “comm on sense”.
Non-alignment and the American Alliance
When discussing this vital issue Horne veers 
between optimism and “ realism”; but ultimately he 
shows a preference for the “realistic” option. While 
he acknowledges the possibility of certain contrary 
s t rands  in a viable, a lternative s trategic 
imagination -  the danger of great power 
entanglements, the virtue of non-alignment, etc — 
he leaves one in no doubt that in his opinion Labor 
has little choice about the American alliance. It is 
part of the dominant “common sense”; repudiation 
will bring terrible economic retribution; the 
importance of the United States’ Australian bases 
is just so great that American intervention, perhaps 
in secret, will stop the election of or throw out a 
Labor government. In addition, if there is a divided 
loyalty, A SIO ’s adherence to the United States 
intelligence community transcends loyalty to an 
elected Australian government. So Horne seems 
stuck on the horns of his own dilemma. He urges 
independence on Labor vis-a-vis the Liberals, but 
when it comes to the Liberals’ international 
backers, the United States, he just cannot bring 
himself to visualise an effective Labor challenge.
In searching for an answer to his own 
puzzlement about why in Australia the Labor 
Party is seen to be a threat to the natural order of 
things, Horne follows many predecessors into 
what is a pretty vain discussion about turning the 
Labor Party into a "genuine liberal party". He, like 
others, buys the idea that if only the Labor Party 
severed its links with the trade unions and 
abandoned socialism completely, it would be 
acceptable to a wider spectrum of the electorate, 
and so not such a different case as other social- 
democratic parties. (In other sections of the book 
Horne tends to contradict this judgment) . In
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particular, the Labor Party would be more 
receptive and acceptable to the “new class” — 
bureaucrats, technocrats, teachers, publicists, 
artists, intellectuals, performers, promoters and 
students, as well as keepers of corner stores, small 
farmers, owners of small businesses, etc. However, 
Horne forgets that the Whitlam Labor Party of 
1966-72 had a significant following of these people; 
and in fact the Labor Party has always had the 
support of some shopkeepers, farmers and small 
business people. It has always been a social 
coalition, if based on the trade unions.
Australia and the United States
Horne makes comparisons between Australian 
and American societies, but the differences are 
more significant than the similarities. For 
example, the United States before World War 1 
had a  far stronger socialist movement than 
Australia, although there was no American Labor 
Party. And where is the genuine American liberal 
party? One of the saving graces of the Australian 
Labor Party is that it has many militant union 
affiliates. Through these affiliations there are 
many radical and progressive inputs into Labor 
Party policies; to a large degree this is what makes 
the Labor Party what it is — gives it its "class 
basis”, if you like. If the Labor Party was dissolved, 
then another Labor Party would be formed. 
Moreover, Horne is a bit inconsistent on this point. 
In discussion the Labor Party’s difficulties due to 
the prevailing “comm on sense”, he stresses the 
urgent need to create a new Labor common sense, 
and he also describes the trade unions as the 
“greatest strength of the labour movement”.
Despite Donald H orne’s pessimism about 
Labor’s chances of forming a government with a 
really independent foreign policy, he seems to 
believe genuinely that voting in elections matters, 
even if it may be largely for the sake of 
appearances. Horne is concerned that the 1980 
election like especially the 1954, 1961 and 1969 
elections wasn’t fair. In 1980 the winning 
coalition of parties, with a margin of one percent of 
the votes, obtained twenty per cent more 
parliamentary representatives. So, under every 
normal heading of political reform, Australia as a 
l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  is u n i q u e l y  
unsatisfactory in terms of fairness.
Democratic Government
Not particularly enamoured of government, 
even representative democracy, Horne is inclined 
as a democratic ideal towards anarchism. Short of 
a complete radical reform towards social and 
participatory democracy, however, we are left, he 
recognises, with the need to elect a government.
Under these circumstances we need fairer voting 
systems, public funding of elections, fixed terms 
for parliaments and constitutional amendments in 
order to  entrench responsible government. Then a 
government supported by a majority in the more 
democratically elected part of parliament could 
not be brought down between elections by an 
upper house or an elected executive person.
Horne favours multi-member constituencies, 
providing a proportionate representation, which 
would come close to reflecting exactly the voting 
support for parties and groups. Hence, any 
government formed from this sort of politically 
representative system would be a politically 
democratic government — at least as far as formal 
rules can go in making it possible. But.as Horne 
readily acknowledges such changes could occur 
and there still may not be the possibility of a 
genuinely democratic government: there are 
powerful constraints, one of which is the power of 
“comm on sense”. It is in this area of ideology and 
culture that we can see an important novelty in 
H orne’s thinking.
Common Sense
In dealing with why so many people believe that 
unemployment is caused or aggravated by “dole- 
bludging”, Horne gives a simple, lucid exposition 
of the Gramscian marxist concept of “hegemony”.
.... the attitudes of those who command the 
economic system and control the economic 
surplus are likely to permeate society so widely 
and deeply, in ways of behaving as well as ways of 
thinking, that for ma/iy or most people these 
attitudes are "reality" and "common sense". 
People "naturally" think and act in ways that suit 
the dominant class. Certain ways of behaving 
seem the only way to behave (p. 32).
Leaving aside the point that he uses “common 
sense” in a not strictly Gramscian way but more or 
less as a synonym for “hegemony”, Donald 
H orne’s introduction of a Gramscian mode into his 
thinking is perhaps the most striking single feature 
of his new book. This novel strand in his thought 
suggests both Horne’s openness to fresh ways of 
viewing the reality, that he is probing, and the 
evolution of his ideological position. There is still a 
bit of the old pragmatism, but the strength of his 
analysis is sharpened by a distinct partisanship, for 
which he apologises, but in which he persists, often 
most eloquently.
Horne divides the dominant “common sense” 
into five subdivisions: the notion of Australia as a 
modernised, industrial society; Australia as a 
capitalist society; Australia as a  liberal-democratic
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society; a strand of the prevailing “widsom” based 
on older, pre-industrialist values, especially the 
Christian religion and moral code, sexism and 
racism; and the strand o f  British colonial 
leftovers, royalism, etc. He then illustrates how the 
Liberal-Country Party coalition has drawn on this 
“comm on sense” to undermine constantly the 
legitimacy of Labor as an independent alternative 
government, although the Labor Party has 
sometimes been its own worst enemy by upholding 
elements of the dominant “com m on sense” such as 
mindless economic growth, racism, sexism etc.
The Media
The dominant “common sense” according to 
Horne, is part of the dom inant culture, and the 
media dominate the public culture; they are “the 
principal storytellers of our modern life”, offering 
“their visions of reality, of human values and 
national priorities and o f ‘com m on sense’ ”. Horne 
considers the different ways business and trade 
union news is handled in the media; the unions, 
“the greatest single strength of the labour 
movem ent”, are constantly represented as a threat 
to consumers and to society. Yet he does not very 
fully examine the role and importance of the 
media, generally, or, in particular,  in the 1980 
election. One of the conspicuous features of the 
recent Federal election campaign was the “fair go” 
tha t Labor received in some sections of the media. 
So much so that Mr Fraser felt obliged to chide 
some newspapers for their lack of support for the 
government. Although Horne recognises the 
uncertainty of Labor's legitimacy, he could have 
more deeply considered the function of the 
privately owned media in creating this state of 
affairs. How does the media operate in helping to 
create this marginal Labor legitimacy?
In place of what could have been a searching 
analysis and some bold prescription, we have a 
discussion of the role of the Canberra press gallery 
and a case for national affairs commentators — 
writers who produce regular analyses of different 
parts of society, seen as an interrelated whole, of 
which they try to make some sense. There is a 
critique of the narrow concentration on politics as 
viewed from parliament house in Canberra, “ha rd” 
news and crises such as the Khemlani fiasco of
1975, and personal and factional rivalries, that the 
media dramatise. But this is of little consequence in 
serious media reform. What needs to  be considered 
are genuinely competing media outlets, either 
reformed or new, that create the possibility of a 
real development of Labor com m on sense.
Donald Horne retognises tha t  it may be
devastatingly difficult to change some aspects of 
Australia’s dom inant “common sense”. After 
outlining a number of fairly modest institutional 
changes that Labor might initiate, Horne remarks 
that if these be thought revolutionary, then why 
d o n ’t we have such a revolution. Providing 
through collective or communal action, the sort of 
labour-intensive, low productivity quality-of-life 
programmes needed to overcome the social effects 
of high-productivity advanced technology would 
require a social revolution and a new kind of 
common sense. Horne urges a struggle for a new 
social morality of co-operation rather than the 
present one of competition and exploitative 
“grow th”, a morality in which what is praised as 
free enterprise is the free enterprise of the many 
expressions of hum an dignity — not a mere 
exaltation of greed”.
Slight as it is, in some ways Winner Take A ll  is 
Donald Horne’s most important book. While 
many of its best ideas lack sufficient development, 
nevertheless it could be the start of public 
discussion of several important and valuable 
notions. Horne has come a long way from his days 
on the Observer and The Bulletin, when he 
sometimes espoused or fostered strongly 
conservative views. However, there were some 
hints of his present analysis at least as far back as 
the first edition of The Lucky Country  (1964) 
which seems to have been a sort of bench mark
— a percipient and prescient book. Nonetheless, 
looked at from H orne’s current ideological 
position, it now seems quite moderate. What 
strikes you about Winner Take All, even 
compared with M oney M ade Us (1976), is the 
much greater analytical thrust that has come 
with partisanship and commitment. Above all 
Horne comes across as a strong Australian 
patriot with a powerful belief in a better 
Australia.
Whereas in the 1960s he was a social critic 
probing Australian attitudes and beliefs but not 
strongly questioning capitalism, he now sees 
Australian capitalists as failing to fight for 
A ustra lian  independence  and  A ustra lian  
advancement. He has largely lost hope in 
capitalism as a progressive force. He now looks 
to the labour movement, specifically the Labor 
Party, for national leadership in the work of 
creating an enlightened society. Where once he 
was inclined to describe pragmatically, now he 
comments forthrightly. Even if Winner Take A ll 
finally falls short of complete satisfaction, it has 
la id  th e  b a s i s  f o r  f u r t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  
developments.
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BIRTH AND DEATH OF THE "RED ARMY FACTION"
The "Red Army Faction" or "Baader- 
Meinhof gang* as it was generally called, 
caused a series of sensations in West Germany 
in the middle-seventies. Their actions 
included kidnappings, bombings, robberies 
and various raids for political ends. A number 
of their main leaders died in prison in 
circumstances which led to controversy as to 
whether they committed suicide or were 
murdered.
Horst Mahler, a former member of the 
group, was interviewed earlier this year in the 
Italian Communist weekly Rinascita. He 
discussed why such a group arose in a country 
like the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 
what their motives were and why they became 
isolated.
A small group of intellectuals, members of 
SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) 
formed the Red Army Fraction (RAF) in 
1967-68. They were concerned with issues 
such as the war in Viet Nam and the way in 
which th e i r  c o u n t ry  was p lay ing  a 
subordinate role to US imperialism, and set 
out to create a more critical public opinion.
But the spread of the mass student re­
volts throughout Europe, and the May 
1968 events in France and the beginn­
ings of social and trade union struggles 
in the FRG itself acted like a thrust on 
the accelerator. We found ourselves con­
fron ting  the possibility o f  revolution 
“here and now” in the heart of capital­
ist Europe.
At the same time it was becoming in­
creasingly clear that, while playing a 
very important role, the students were 
only of limited significance in the situation. 
We debated who would make the revolution, 
and this led to the first split in the student 
movement.
Mahler explained that some, close to 
libertarian and anti-authoritarian positions, 
denied the leading role of the working class. 
In spite of the struggles going on around 
them, they argued that there wouldn’t be a 
revolution in the industrialised countries. The 
other side of the debate maintained that the 
workers would be the main force in any 
revolution while the students could at most 
carry out the function of a “de tonator”.
The next step was organisation: the aim 
was a party of cadres and revolutionaries 
with an emphasis on excluding any deviations 
from the “correct line”. In this way, the 
a tmosphere of open debate and comradeship 
which had existed in the student movement 
was destroyed.
Finally there was the decisive step — 
to decide on what concrete fo rm s  of 
struggle to adopt. Our analysis of victor­
ious revolutions — from the Chinese to the 
Algerian or Cuban or Vietnamese — indica­
ted to us that the central subject was not 
the classical proletariat and that it was 
possible to make the revolution outside 
the classical scheme.
Consequently, the only thing that counted 
was to  decide on revolution and m ake it. 
But in Europe, at least, a mass, popular 
revolution could not be organised, so we 
had to form small, resolute groups able 
to show that it was possible to resist
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and a revolutionary example. These were 
the ideas which led to the choice of the 
urban guerrilla warfare tactic.
Asked about early terrorist actions, Mahler 
told of an early split which developed in the 
“armed struggle movement”. It arose from 
some unsuccessful actions and the decision to 
plant a bomb in the Berlin synagogue to 
protest against the repression of the 
Palestinian guerrillas. You can imagine what 
that meant for some of us who had grown up 
politically with the guilt complex of our 
fathers regarding the Jews.
I was strongly opposed to such tactics. 1 did 
not oppose armed struggle in principle, only 
certain applications.
During this period we tried to elaborate our 
strategy. There were two main conflicting 
perspectives for out future. The majority 
maintained that although the people showed 
no interest in revolutionary struggle, it 
was nevertheless necessary to build links 
with the masses, to weave relationships 
and anchor ourselves to reality. The min­
ority, however, saw our role only as a 
component ol the revolutionary movement 
of the Third World and wanted R A F  to be a 
kind of “fifth colum n” of the national 
liberation wars. They had an extremely 
negative view on the possibility of the 
masses in Western countries playing an 
active role. Neither was there any desire 
to take account of the psychology of the 
population of our country. Thus the 
group that gave rise to R A F  began with 
“basic w ork” in Berlin.
Mahler believes that the entry of Andreas 
Baader into the organisation increased the 
tempo.
There is no doubt that he played a key 
part in the evolution of RAF. This was not 
only because of the influence of his activ­
ism and decisiveness, but also because 
the first terrorist action of R A F was 
intended to free Baader from prison in 
Berlin. During this operation a worker 
was seriously injured and from that 
moment on we became fugitives, isolated 
from everyone and particularly from the 
Left. This forced us to  change our line.
It became impossible to conduct mass work 
and in this way any relationship with 
reality was lost. The minority line then 
appeared to us by a process of psycholo­
gical rationalisation, to be the correct
line. The only way that remained was that 
of violent action.....
Mahler was questioned about the fact that 
the explosives used in the first actions were 
provided by a counter-espionage agent who 
had infiltrated their ranks. Did they ever have 
any idea that they were being used by others, 
to act as a convenient tool of reaction. He 
replied that he understood the point of the 
question very well but thought it would be 
“too convenient” to hide behind it.
It explains almost nothing. Certainly not 
the internal dynamics of a terrorist group.
In fact the secret service agent played no 
decisive role, at least a$,far as the ideological 
choice of armed struggle or the kind of actions 
undertaken. He was “used”. He certainly 
provided information about us and con­
tributed to the arrest of Baader, but he 
alone could not have convinced us to take 
the road of terrorism.
Regarding the use made of terrorism by the 
Right - we knew very well that there was a 
long tradition, in France for example, of 
infiltration of revolutionary movements 
by the police to push them into blind 
alleys. Yet this was not enough to make us 
refrain from what seemed to be a necessary 
choice. At the beginning however, we did seek 
to follow a strategy which would make it 
impossible for us to be used.
Mahler then spoke of his disillusionment 
with R A F ’s strategy:
My break with the RAF, when I was already 
in prison, came after the attack on the 
Hamburg skyscraper, the headquarters of 
the Springer press. It was an attack which 
I knew had been organised by the left. But 
the negative effects were such that it 
could well have been initiated by the 
right.
From then on, everything became clearer; 
the things the R A F  organised were indis­
tinguishable from the things for which the 
right sought to blame us, so wrong and 
suicidal was our strategy.
Asked to explain the growing number of 
disillusioned terrorists, Mahler said;
The failure of terrorism, not only in West 
Germany, is now clear. It is not jus t a 
technical-military defeat, leaving the hope 
that better results could be achieved with a 
different organisation, but a failure in 
principle. I believe it was a disastrous
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policy of a certain component of the left and 
of the theoretical-political premises on which 
their actions were based.
It is a failure of what 1 would call “the 
politics of the Advent” (the coming of Christ
— D.D.) with its mystical idea of revolution 
and transformation of the world. If we look at 
the reality around us, is it really possible 
to th ink of achieving our ends with ideas 
like that of u rban guerrilla war?
Mahler concluded by saying that the left, or 
at least part of it, is confronted with the need
to re-examine itself and the principles on 
which it has based its existence.
To produce the great event of revolution 
we must have the courage to apply our 
strength and our consciences in a different 
way.
The alternative to this is the degenera­
tion of political action into blind activ­
ism, into purely criminal action without 
prospects, like the rock song which says, 
“macht kaputt was euch kaputt macht!” 
(Destroy that which is destroying you!).
ALR price to increase
Rising costs of all kinds, including postage and the new 
sales tax, have forced us to increase the price of 
Australian Left Review to $2 as from the next issue, 
March 1982. However, we also hope to increase the size 
of ALR  from 48 to 64 pages as from the same issue.
The price of ALR  has stood at $1 for four years now 
(since March 1978) so we believe that the new price will 
still be good value for money.
Although we are currently printing ALR  only four 
times a year, a subscription is still for six issues. 
Subscriptions are $12, including postage, $8 for students, 
apprentices, unemployed and pensioners. Renewals will 
be at the new rate. Surface or airmail postage will be 
added to overseas subscriptions.
An Offer to New Subscribers
For new ALR subscribers before March 1982, there 
will be a concessional rate of $8.
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